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INTRODUCTION
Who should pay to prevent catastrophic climate change?1  Should
it be the rich, who can more easily bear the costs?2  Or the poor,
whose poverty makes them more vulnerable to dramatic changes in
1 For an overview of the scientific consensus on the dangers of climate change, see INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS
(2000), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), and INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS].
2 Rumi Shammin & Clark W. Bullard, Impact of Cap-and-Trade Policies for Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions on U.S. Households, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2432, 2436 (2009).
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the environment,3 and so arguably have more to gain?  These are chal-
lenging questions, and contemporary advocates of major policies
aimed at preventing climate change have attempted to avoid them
through proposals that claim to be “distributionally neutral.”4  For ex-
ample, some of those who suggest increasing the price of greenhouse
gas production to account for its damage to the global climate claim
that, though their schemes would fall more heavily on the poor, this
burden can be balanced out by providing a tax rebate to households
with the lowest incomes.5  Pending legislation incorporates a similar
rebate feature.6  In this Article, we argue that although these rebate
schemes are nobly intentioned, as currently designed, they do not ac-
tually achieve distributional neutrality.  We go on to proffer more
carefully tailored alternatives that might get closer to true equality.
To see the central problem of the rebate scheme, consider: Would
you rather be poor for eleven months and rich for one, or middle-class
the whole year round?  From the way they behave, it looks like most
people would prefer the latter—a “smooth” income is better than an
income with the same total value but more peaks and valleys.7  That is
because the pain of the lows is, typically, worse than the satisfaction of
the pinnacles.8  Thus, we save up for rainy days, or insure against
them, transferring money from ourselves when we are wealthy to our-
selves when we are poor.9
The carbon tax rebate schemes neglect this basic point.10  The tax
raises prices for households throughout the year, reducing their stan-
3 IMPACTS, supra note 1, at 19.
4 Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 499, 516 (2009); Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equita-
ble Tax Reform to Address Global Climate Change 16 (Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper No.
2007-12, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/papers/2007/10carbontax_
metcalf/10_carbontax_metcalf.pdf.
5 Terry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading:
How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 199, 206 (2002);
Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 514 n.66 (endorsing Metcalf’s earlier proposal); Metcalf,
supra note 4, at 11–20; see also David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon
Emissions Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1190–96 (2010)
(presenting and discussing proposals to “offset the regressive effects of higher energy costs”).
6 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 764 (2009);
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2454 AMERI-
CAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 20 (2009).
7 ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 187–88 (1995).
8 Id. at 186.
9 Id. at 187–88.
10 An exception is David Super, who briefly acknowledges that poor households may face
higher energy costs during different parts of the year that borrowing cannot satisfy. See Super,
supra note 5, at 1185–87.  He urges policymakers to target assistance to those times. Id.
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dard of living.  In the case of households of very low incomes, even a
modest tax—carbon tax estimates tend to run in the vicinity of $1200
per household annually—could represent a substantial loss in
wealth.11  The drop from $1000 per month in household income to
$900 is a steep one; it can mean the difference between making rent or
not, or eating three meals a day versus two.  A repayment of $1200 at
year’s end does not fully alleviate this lower standard of living; empty
stomachs cannot be retroactively filled.
Of course, the proponents of these schemes probably did not just
overlook a fundamental tenet of modern economics.  Instead, they
likely assume that households can convert the lumpy tax-rebate com-
bination into a smooth income stream simply by borrowing against
it.12  If that were true, then we would have little objection to the claim
that the tax-rebate combination is distributionally neutral.
Unfortunately, as we review here, the evidence shows over-
whelmingly that low-income households cannot easily borrow, even
against a guaranteed future payment.13  For one thing, poor house-
holds generally lack a credit history.14  Since lenders cannot easily tell
conscientious borrowers from deadbeats who will skip town before
their checks arrive, they must charge exorbitant rates to break even.
And because the borrowers have few alternatives, and may not even
Although we adopt the common lingo in terming these levies a “carbon tax,” most propos-
als would also include taxes on the production of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.
Metcalf, supra note 4, at 12.
11 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO2
EMISSIONS 2 tbl.1 (2007) (estimating costs of a 15% reduction in carbon emissions for median
households at $960, or $1184 in 2009 dollars); ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, DESIGNING CLIMATE-CHANGE LEGISLATION THAT SHIELDS LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS FROM INCREASED POVERTY AND HARDSHIP 1–2 (2008), available at http://
www.cbpp.org/files/10-25-07climate.pdf (putting estimated cost for lowest quintile of homes at
$750 and increasing over time); Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 212 tbl.4 (estimating the
average household cost for a 15% reduction at $1209, or $1488 in 2009 dollars).  All 2009 dollar
calculations are by your present authors; for inflation calculations, see THE INFLATION CALCU-
LATOR, http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
12 See infra Part II.A.2.
13 We are not the first to observe that credit markets and the timing of taxation can affect
social welfare. See Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 34
(2005) (“[B]ehavioral factors and capital market imperfections limit the ability of taxpayers to
fully smooth consumption.”).  We build on Fennell and Stark’s work by adding, for the first time
in the legal literature, a comprehensive survey of the evidence in support of their claim that
there are failures in the market for credit for low-income households.  We also explain how those
failures affect the design of consumption taxes.  Stark and Fennell limit their discussion to the
income tax.
14 For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see infra Part II.B.
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recognize the high cost of the complex fees they face, there is little
price competition among lenders who serve poor communities.
Another problem with the rebate is that it strains the limits of
many households’ cognitive abilities.  Borrowing to offset an expected
tax increase requires a certain amount of awareness of household fi-
nances, as well as a modest amount of sophistication and enterprise to
understand them and translate that knowledge into the act of applying
for a loan.  Again, evidence suggests that these problems have pre-
vented many families from borrowing even against guaranteed future
income.15
One solution to the dilemma of delayed rebates is to accelerate
payments.  The climate bill passed in 2009 by the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, for example, would make rebates available monthly via
direct deposit.16  Other proposals would parcel out rebates biweekly
by reducing workers’ payroll tax contributions.17  But these structures,
too, can create serious havoc for some households.  Households are
excessively impatient—they spend sudden windfalls, rather than sav-
ing them.18  Thus, a prepaid rebate, or “prebate,” would, like one that
comes at the end of the year, leave families with excess cash for one
month and poorer for the other eleven.  Moreover, excessive or “hy-
perbolic” impatience leads to procrastination—because the present is
more valuable than the future, many taxpayers would not invest in
efforts to understand a carbon tax or in technologies to reduce their
future carbon consumption.  Both these sets of problems, as we ex-
plain, are more acute for low-income families.19
Prepayment not only affects the fairness of a carbon tax, but also
may undermine its environmental goals.  Carbon taxes and other simi-
lar policies, such as cap-and-trade regimes, are designed to force users
and producers of carbon to take account of the social cost of their
decisions.20  By increasing the price to reflect the harms carbon does
to others, the taxes aim to reduce carbon production to a socially opti-
15 See infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
16 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 431 (2009).
17 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax Sys-
tem, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 288 (2002).
18 For discussion of this paragraph, see infra Part III.
19 See infra Part IV.
20 Paul Ekins & Terry Barker, Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading, in ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 75, 77–79 (Nick Hanley & Colin J. Roberts eds., 2002); Nicholas
Bull et al., Who Pays Broad-Based Energy Taxes? Computing Lifetime and Regional Incidence,
15 ENERGY J. 145, 147 (1994).
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mal level.21  As we model here, however, hyperbolic households who
receive a prepayment may well increase their consumption of carbon-
intensive goods.22
It is worth emphasizing that our goal is not to argue against car-
bon pricing, but is instead to improve the design of any pricing system.
Thus, after we have identified the likely timing problems of current
rebate proposals, we suggest a set of alternatives that would mitigate
these problems, as well as offer some other side benefits to poorer
communities.23  For example, the government could disburse rebates
through a self-directed debit card, or “SDD.”  The SDD allows recipi-
ents to draw down their rebate throughout the year, without having to
incur massive fees from the “fringe” lending industry.  The amount of
funds available each week, however, is by default limited in advance,
subject to modification by the cardholder.  Thus, a taxpayer who fears
she will overspend once she gets access to her rebate can precommit
herself to spreading the rebate out over the course of the year.  That
commitment could be undone, but only through a cumbersome pro-
cess.  This proposal preserves consumer choice, while helping to
nudge taxpayers away from temptation.24  Issuing debit cards also has
the useful benefit of expanding access to electronic transactions and
other everyday banking services many of us take for granted, but
which are unavailable to most of the poorest households.
Although the discussion here is framed around carbon pricing,
our analysis could also be readily translated to any other form of con-
sumption tax.  Many leading proposals for national sales taxes or
value-added taxes (“VAT”) include some kind of rebate to soften
their disproportionate impact on low-income households.25  These
proposals, too, have ignored the timing and cognitive problems we
outline here.  And they also could benefit from our proposed
improvements.
The Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I first explains the basic
“welfarist” economic analysis of distributive justice and its implica-
tions for saving and borrowing behavior.  It then sketches the distribu-
tive consequences of various consumption tax proposals, including
21 That is, the carbon tax is a “Pigouvian” tax, a levy priced according to the size of the
negative externality the product creates for others.  Bull et al., supra note 20, at 147.
22 See infra Part III.C.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 Our methodology here owes an obvious debt to RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 105–20
(2009).
25 For a survey, see infra Part I.B.
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carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regimes, and notes their dependence
on the assumption that taxpayers smooth their incomes across the en-
tire year.  Part II considers the true distributive effects of a combined
consumption tax rebate regime, arguing that it is unlikely many poor
households could smooth their incomes without very high costs.  It
also shows that a prebate regime will have analogous shortcomings.
Part III relaxes the assumption in Part II that households have stable
preferences over time and shows that time inconsistency will only ex-
acerbate the general problems identified in Part II.  Part IV sets out
our proposed reforms.  Lastly, Part V considers some general objec-
tions to our framework, in particular the possible claims that our ap-
proach is paternalist, and that our approach is irrelevant because the
only important measure of distributive justice is over a lifetime, not
annually.
I. CONSUMPTION TAXES AND “DISTRIBUTIONALLY
NEUTRAL” REBATES
This Part introduces the basics of how economists usually ap-
proach questions of distributive justice.  Under the standard approach,
consumption taxes are widely acknowledged to impose an excessive
burden on poor taxpayers.  Thus, as we outline, most major consump-
tion tax proposals include some mechanism for softening that blow,
typically in the form of a rebate for taxpayers below a given income
threshold.  Readers already familiar with these proposals may safely
skip to Part I.C.
A. Distributive Justice in a “Welfarist” Framework
There are many different ways to decide how to fairly distribute
the burden of paying for government.  This Article focuses mostly on
“welfarism,” the analytical tool of choice for many economists and
other policy analysts.26  We emphasize welfarism because it is the met-
ric used by those who propose the consumption taxes we criticize, and
our goal is to engage those proposals on their own terms.27
26 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, at G-11 (2d ed. 2007).
27 In addition, virtually all ethical systems agree that welfare has at least some moral
weight.  Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 391, 391 (2005).
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Welfarism is a variant of utilitarianism.28  As in Bentham’s origi-
nal utilitarian approach,29 it aims to measure the sum of every individ-
ual’s utility, which is usually defined in turn as the degree to which
each person is able to achieve their subjective preferences.30  The sum
total of every person’s preferences is the “social welfare function,” or
SWF.31  Welfarism departs somewhat from Bentham, though, in per-
mitting each person’s preference for the fair distribution of goods to
itself count in the SWF.32  For instance, if some people would be
troubled by a society in which wealth were highly concentrated, those
feelings of demoralization would lower overall welfare.33  The
welfarist would say that, given such an SWF, a society with more equi-
tably distributed wealth would be preferable to the inequitable one.34
In addition to incorporating other ethical systems, welfarism itself
recommends redistribution from rich to poor in many circumstances.
The basic premise is that each person, on average, has a diminishing
marginal utility of wealth.35  That is, the richer people already are, the
28 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 25 (2006) (explaining that a welfarist decision procedure “is a rough-and-ready proxy
for overall well-being”).
29 See generally THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1962).
30 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002).  There
is some controversy on whether subjective preference satisfaction is the best measure of an indi-
vidual’s well-being. See generally ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 29–35 (sketching the
controversy); Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of In-
tergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 192–93 (2001) (same).  Some scholars argue
instead that simple happiness is the best measure.  John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness,
98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010).  Others maintain that, in light of the possibility that people will not
choose what is best for themselves, the better metric would be the extent to which society
achieves a more objective view of the good life. See generally Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-
Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).  Although
both these views have points in their favor, neither is mainstream among policy analysts. See
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 29 (noting that “many welfare economists” adopt “the
simple preference-based account”).  Thus, this Article will generally take welfare to mean the
satisfaction of subjective preferences.
31 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 23.
32 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 17, 21, 31.  On the indifference of utilitarians to
distribution, see Solum, supra note 30, at 191–93.  Some welfarists also distinguish themselves
from Bentham on the grounds that Bentham believed utility should be measured according to
happiness rather than satisfaction of preferences. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at
29–32.
33 See David W. Pearce, Framework for Assessing the Distribution of Environmental Qual-
ity, in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23, 62–63 (Yse Serret & Nick
Johnstone eds., 2006) (describing how the SWF takes account of preferences for fairness).
34 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 17; Dale W. Jorgenson et al., Carbon Taxes
and Economic Welfare, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS
1992, at 393, 396 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1992).
35 GRUBER, supra note 26, at 29–30.
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less each additional dollar gained or lost is worth in utility.  For exam-
ple, if Charlie has $1000 and loses $500, he is in serious trouble, and
may face hunger or eviction.  If he has $1 million and loses $500, he is
mildly bummed.  Thus, welfarists agree that some degree of transfer
from the richest to the poorest is often likely to increase social
welfare.36
The idea of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth also has
important implications for saving and borrowing.  If Charlie is ra-
tional, he will attempt to smooth his expenditures to move the pain of
losing money from his poorest times to his richest times.37  For exam-
ple, if Charlie knows he will retire one day, and earn only one-tenth of
his current income, he should put money in the bank to reduce the
utility cost of the dollars he must spend for upkeep in retirement.38  In
saving, Charlie gives up consumption today, but that does not hurt as
much because today he is rich.  Charlie’s net utility across his life will
be higher when he saves because the cost of putting money away is
smaller than the gain of being able to spend it later.
Borrowing is similar, but with time’s arrow reversed.  Borrowing
increases our wealth now but decreases it later.  If people expect to be
richer when payment comes due, this should increase their welfare.
The problem is that many people may be liquidity-constrained; they
cannot borrow the full, utility-maximizing amount.39  For example,
people may have private information about their own future earning
potential that would be difficult for a lender to obtain or verify.40  This
is the rationale behind, for example, government subsidies for student
loans.41
Finally, it is important for our later discussion to emphasize that
there can be complex interactions between the welfarist arguments for
redistribution, savings, and borrowing.  In particular, note that many
36 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 23.  We qualify the language in the text because
most welfarists argue that redistribution also creates transaction costs, such as the possibility that
taxes on high earners might discourage work. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
667, 680–81 (1994).
37 Martin Browning & Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro
Facts, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1797, 1799–800 (1996); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Taxing Will-
power 8 (Dec. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/
download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=162354.
38 See Browning & Lusardi, supra note 37, at 1800.
39 See Fennell & Stark, supra note 13, at 12.
40 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 770
(2007).
41 See GRUBER, supra note 26, at 288.
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people who look relatively poor by some measures today may in fact
have the ability to borrow against ample future earnings—consider
medical students.42  Others may look wealthy because they have bor-
rowed heavily, but in the long run will in fact be poor.  So the question
whether redistribution today will increase society’s current welfare
may depend on our ability to determine individuals’ abilities to save
or borrow.
B. Existing Tax and Rebate Proposals
Consumption taxes may have undesirable distributive conse-
quences when evaluated under a welfarist framework.  A consump-
tion tax is a tax on the purchase or use of goods and services.43  Sales
taxes are a typical example.44
Consumption taxes are more burdensome for poorer taxpayers in
two distinct ways.  First, the poor consume a larger portion of their
income.45  Because they spend more and save less, consumption taxes
will occupy much more of the budgets of the indigent than the rela-
tively better-off.46
Even if rich and poor saved comparable amounts, consumption
taxes would still be harder on the poor because of the diminishing
marginal utility of wealth.47  A tax that demands an equal percentage
42 See Henrik Klinge Jacobsen et al., Distributional Implications of Environmental Taxa-
tion in Denmark, 24 FISCAL STUD. 477, 478 (2003) (“[M]any households with low current in-
comes are students or pensioners with higher lifetime income.”).
43 Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 961 (1992).
44 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
605–14 (9th ed. 2009).  A point worth noting for any “tax geeks” among our readers is that we
use the term “consumption tax” to refer to what is more technically known as a “transactional
consumption tax.”  George K. Yin, Accommodating the “Low Income” in a Cash-Flow or Con-
sumed Income Tax World, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 445, 450 (1995).  The transactional tax should be
distinguished from a “cash-flow consumption tax,” which is simply a consumption tax collected
out of income, i.e., an income tax with a deduction for savings. Id. at 451–52.  The timing mis-
matches we alluded to in the Introduction are perhaps avoidable under a cash-flow consumption
tax.  For one thing, a cash-flow consumption tax could achieve progressivity by changing its rate
structure. See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1428–30 (2006).
45 Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 209.
46 GREENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 1; Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 210;
Daniel R. Feenberg et al., Distributional Effects of Adopting a National Retail Sales Tax, 11 TAX
POL’Y & ECON. 49, 86 (1997); Yin, supra note 44, at 459.  Poor households also spend a higher
portion of their incomes on carbon-intensive products.  Shammin & Bullard, supra note 2, at
2436.
47 Cf. JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POL-
ICY 88 (1989) (discussing vertical equity and how fairness concerns allow for different tax treat-
ment for differently situated persons).
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of the budgets of two different people will impose a greater utility loss
on the one who is poorer.48  For example, suppose Raheem earns $1
million per year and Parvati $10,000.  Both spend all their income on
consumption, which is taxed at ten percent.  Raheem will pay $100,000
in taxes, leaving him with a quite comfortable $900,000 for consump-
tion.  Parvati will be left with $9000 after taxes and may have to trim
back her grocery budget.  More technically, Parvati’s ten-percent tax
comes out of very high-priority goods, and hence goods that provide a
very large amount of utility, while Raheem’s comes out of goods from
which the average consumer would derive very small utility.49
Most existing consumption taxes recognize this disparity and at-
tempt to correct for it.  For example, the sales tax laws of most U.S.
states exempt from tax rent and food prepared in the home, in order
to mitigate the burden of the sales tax on those whose expenditures
are mostly food and shelter.50  In Europe, modern VATs—a form of
transactional consumption tax imposed on both consumer goods and
their inputs—follow a similar approach.51  Previously, some European
VATs exempted taxpayers below a certain income threshold from any
VAT liability.52  Canada currently issues VAT rebates to low-income
families.53
Proponents of new major consumption taxes offer more sophisti-
cated versions of these mitigation efforts.  Michael Graetz argues in
favor of a U.S. VAT, and proposes to render it distributionally neutral
by reducing payroll tax withholding for low-income workers.54
48 John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 435 (1953).
49 See GRUBER, supra note 26, at 29–30.
50 Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the Context of Declining State Sales
Tax Bases, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1373, 1375–76 (2000); Robert F. van Brederode, Introduction to the
U.S. States Sales and Use Taxes, 19 INT’L VAT MONITOR 270, 271–72 (2007).
51 See Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Biometrics: Solving the Regressivity of VATs and
RSTs with “Smart Card” Technology, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 651, 656–57 & nn.8–9 (2007) (surveying
U.S. sales tax and European VAT exemptions).
52 See William J. Turnier, Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax, 39 TAX L. REV. 435,
438–39 (1984).  A “flat tax,” as proposed by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, takes a VAT-like
approach in exempting some income from any tax; for a family of four, they suggest the first
$25,500 in earnings would be untaxed. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX
59 (2d ed. 1995).
53 Robert E. Hall, Guidelines for Tax Reform: The Simple, Progressive Value-Added Con-
sumption Tax, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 70, 73 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A.
Hassett eds., 2005).
54 See Graetz, supra note 17, at 290–91; see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1905, 1908 n.5 (1987) (explaining the use of “demogrants” to achieve a desirable level of progres-
sivity in a tax system with regressive rates).
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George Yin has also described other methods for assuring that a cash-
flow consumption tax could putatively avoid regressivity problems,
such as through a payroll tax rebate and refundable income tax
credit.55  And proponents of the so-called “fair tax” urge the United
States to adopt a national sales tax and claim that they can balance out
any resulting unfairness either through an annual payroll tax rebate or
through a prebate to poor households.56
Many carbon tax or cap-and-trade proposals contain similar fea-
tures.57  In the most basic model, each individual taxpayer would sim-
ply receive a lump-sum tax rebate, consisting of some fraction of the
total revenue brought in by the carbon tax.58  Metcalf and Weisbach
The most significant component of payroll taxes is the Social Security tax, which is a flat
6.2% assize on the first $106,000 or so of salary received by the employee, plus an additional
6.2% tax on each dollar of salary paid by the employer.  I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 430 (2006) (authorizing the Commissioner of Social Security to determine the amount of wages
subject to the Social Security tax); Social Security and Medicare Taxes, IRS.GOV, http://
www.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=177943,00.html (noting the cap amount for 2009 and 2010).
Medicare taxes add an additional 1.45% on each side for a total of 15.3%.  I.R.C. §§ 3101(b),
3111(b).  For a helpful overview of the Social Security tax system, see Jonathan B. Forman,
Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 149–55 (2004).
55 See generally Yin, supra note 44, at 466–90 (evaluating tax proposals to accommodate
low-income people).  Yin, however, is skeptical that these proposals are worth pursuing. Id. at
490–91.
56 Paul Bachman et al., Taxing Sales Under the FairTax: What Rate Works?, 113 TAX
NOTES 663, 668 (2006) (prebate); David R. Burton & Dan R. Mastromarco, Emancipating
America from the Income Tax: How the National Sales Tax Would Work, CATO INST., n.42 (Apr.
15, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-272.html (rebate).
57 Legislators can design a cap-and-trade mechanism to be economically equivalent to a
carbon tax. See Ekins & Barker, supra note 20, at 79–80.  A carbon tax imposed on energy
producers usually consists of a set price per unit of carbon emitted by the producer. See Metcalf,
supra note 4, at 14.  Under cap-and-trade, energy producers must acquire a permit in order to
produce each unit of carbon. See Super, supra note 5, at 1106–07.  Since there are a limited
number of permits available, if permits are tradeable, the market will determine a price for each
unit of carbon. See id. at 1107; see also Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 202–03 (illustrating
the effects of carbon restrictions on the market).  The government can set the number of availa-
ble permits so that, at equilibrium, the market price per unit will be the same as it would be
under a direct carbon tax.  With that said, there are design differences between the two models.
See Metcalf, supra note 4, at 22–27 (arguing that a carbon tax is superior to cap-and-trade); cf.
Ethan Yale, Taxing Cap-and-Trade Environmental Regulation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 548
(2008) (explaining that corporate income taxes may distort the intended carbon-abatement
properties of a cap-and-trade regime).  These differences, however, are not pertinent to our
discussion.
We note, though, that the conventional analysis of the choice between carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade depends on the information available to policymakers. GRUBER, supra note 26, at
143–46.  To the extent that behavioral responses to different forms of carbon pricing introduce
new uncertainties, these responses might also alter the choice between pricing instruments.  We
are grateful to Mitchell Kane for this point.
58 See Metcalf, supra note 4, at 18 (modeling but not endorsing this approach).  Despite
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suggest a somewhat more complex scheme, in which each worker will
receive a rebate on her payroll tax.59  In practice, the worker pays
most of the employer-side tax because the employer reduces salary to
account for the cost of the tax.60  Metcalf proposes rebating the full
fifteen percent to workers, but capping the rebate at about $560.61  Al-
ternatively, Metcalf suggested that low-wage earners might get a
credit against their federal income tax.62
According to Metcalf and Weisbach, their rebate plan helps en-
sure that carbon taxes would be distributionally neutral.63  Because
the rebate is capped, it will have much larger proportional value to
low-income households.64  This disproportionate benefit aims to offset
the disproportionate burden of their cap-and-trade regime.65
The bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009
adopts a similar approach to Metcalf.  If enacted, the bill would au-
thorize repayments to households under 150% of the federal poverty
line in an amount equal to the expected average cost of carbon pricing
for those households.66  Payments would be made monthly, either via
direct deposit to existing bank accounts, or through deposits to ac-
counts for the receipt of government benefits, such as the “EBT” ac-
count used by recipients of food stamps.67
Many forms of consumption tax, then, recognize the dangers of
regressivity and make some efforts to eliminate them.  In many cases,
the safeguard mechanism is some form of annual rebate.  As we now
the rebate, consumers would still have incentives to reduce their use of carbon-intensive prod-
ucts.  Since everyone receives the same rebate, but taxes depend on carbon usage, households
that do a better job reducing their carbon footprint will end the year with more money.  Sham-
min & Bullard, supra note 2, at 2437.
59 See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 513–14 & n.66 (citing Metcalf, supra note 4, at
14).
60 See John A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. ECON. REV.
110, 111 (1971); Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile, 15 J.
LAB. ECON. S72, S78–79 (1997).
61 Metcalf, supra note 4, at 14.
62 Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms, 52 NAT’L TAX J.
655, 663 (1999).
63 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 516; Metcalf, supra note 4, at 16.
64 Metcalf, supra note 4, at 16.
65 Id.; see also Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 213 tbl.6 (estimating the distribu-
tional effects of various rebate models); Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate
Policy: Alternate Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 2, 19 (Res. for Future, Discus-
sion Paper No. 09-17-REV, 2009) (projecting that several versions of a carbon tax rebate could
be distributionally neutral, but finding that a payroll tax rebate might not).
66 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 431 (2009)
(adding a new § 2201(d) to the Social Security Act).
67 Id.
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argue, however, the timing of rebates may matter as much as their
amount.
C. Importance of Income Smoothing
An important, albeit implicit, caveat to claims of many distribu-
tionally neutral consumption taxes is that they assume households are
capable of perfectly smoothing their incomes over time.  That is, they
presume that money received in one lump can be spread out more
evenly through borrowing or saving.  Again, where there is a diminish-
ing marginal utility of wealth, both borrowing and saving are critical
to maximizing each person’s utility.
To take an admittedly extreme example, suppose that taxpayers
must consume their rebate checks in full within a month of receipt.
Now take a household with $1000 in monthly income, $100 in monthly
consumption tax costs, and a $1200 rebate check.  For eleven months
of the year, the household will have a standard of living of a family
with a net income of $900, meaning that they will have a small home,
eat only essentials, and skimp on other expenses.  In the rebate
month, they must consume $2100 worth of goods, meaning that they
will have to purchase many things to which they assign relatively low
utility—true luxuries.68  In the absence of the spending requirement,
the family could instead live at a $1000-per-month standard of living
year-round.  The family could devote the extra $100 to high-utility re-
curring expenses, such as food and rent.
Thus, the time-limited rebate, although apparently distribution-
ally neutral, in fact reduces the welfare of recipient households.
Households that cannot smooth their rebate over the year will lose
utility relative to those that can.  The size of the loss will depend on
the degree to which the marginal utility of wealth diminishes for that
household—how much more well-being the family gets from safer
housing and better nutrition than, say, from going to the movies.
While no one is proposing to enact a time-limited rebate, there
are many conditions in the real world that result in imperfect house-
hold income smoothing.  For a family of modest means, being poor for
364 days and rich for 1 is often not the same as being middle-class for
the whole year.  We explore some of the sources of imperfect smooth-
ing over the next two Parts.
68 Of course, it is possible that the family could prepay its rent or purchase some durable
goods and, in that way, improve its standard of living for subsequent months.  Purchase of dura-
ble goods, in effect, is a form of savings.  But let us rule out durable-goods purchases to be true
to the spirit of our hypothetical.
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II. LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS, HIDDEN TAXES, AND REBATES IN
TIME-CONSISTENT HOUSEHOLDS
In this Part, we begin our analysis of the effects of rebate timing
on household welfare.  A single annual rebate can be modeled as oc-
curring either before or after the year’s consumption, corresponding
to a beginning-of-year or end-of-year rebate date.69  Alternatively, the
reader can conceive of the two models both as representing December
31st rebates, but the end-of-year model captures what happens in the
first year of the tax (if the tax is effective January 1st of the same
year), while the beginning-of-year model represents what would occur
in subsequent years for taxpayers who treat the first year of the tax as
a pure loss.  We call the beginning-of-year payment a “prebate” and
use the term “reimbursement” to describe payments at any time of the
year.70
The central problem with the rebate is that households may not
be able to draw on the wealth it represents until the date they actually
receive it.  For example, households may be unable to borrow as much
as they would prefer, or may fail to realize their need or ability to
borrow until after they have been hit by unexpectedly high consump-
tion costs.  In these situations, the year-end increase in wealth may fail
to offset the lost welfare the household experiences during the year.
These same problems arise when the lump sum is converted into a
prebate; taxpayers still face costly or unavailable mechanisms for
moving money from one time to another and must be cognizant of
their need to do so.
Throughout this Part, we assume that households’ preferences
are stable across time.  That seems like a simple assumption, but in
fact it is contrary to much recent evidence.71  In Part III, we revisit our
analysis with the assumption of time consistency relaxed.
A. Liquidity Constraints and Time Discounting
Recent studies of spending by poor households suggest very
strongly that a year-end rebate will not adequately compensate those
households.  While these studies can be interpreted in several ways,
each of these different interpretations likely implies that, on net, low-
income families will lose welfare under a distributionally neutral re-
bate scheme.  First, the evidence shows that poorer households are
69 Burton & Mastromarco, supra note 56, at n.42 (discussing rebates).
70 Bachman et al., supra note 56, at 668 (discussing prebates).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 172–86.
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liquidity constrained—they cannot borrow effectively.72  Even where
individuals were able to borrow, they often paid remarkably high in-
terest rates, implying that the opportunity to smooth income had very
high welfare benefits.73  Second, and alternatively, willingness to pay
high borrowing costs might be evidence not of the gains from smooth-
ing, but simply of impatience—a desire to consume sooner rather than
later.74  But if this is a valid preference that policy analysts ought to
include in their calculation of welfare, the inability to satisfy this impa-
tience would be a strike against a year-end rebate.
1. Evidence of Liquidity Constraints
Although it seems an intuitive point that the very poor cannot
easily borrow, it is theoretically ambiguous how severely any borrow-
ing constraint would bind.  For one, some individuals who are poor
now may not be in the future and might potentially borrow against
“human capital”—their ability to bring in additional revenues in the
future.75  Whether this prospect is realistic depends on how effectively
lenders can discern human capital and motivate borrowers to make
full use of it to repay.76  Additionally, households may have sources of
fiscal and other support that do not show up on their balance sheets,
such as parents and children outside the home, friends, neighbors, or
simply the kindness of strangers.77  Thus, it is useful to have evidence
on whether these kinds of alternatives are important in the real world.
While the empirics do not rule out these factors for some, they do
show that many households are severely liquidity-constrained to the
point where they could not easily borrow the hundreds of dollars rep-
resented by a consumption tax rebate.78  A key set of data is a series of
72 See infra Part II.A.1.
73 See infra Part II.A.2.
74 See David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates
Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 179–81
(2002).
75 See supra Part I.A.
76 See GRUBER, supra note 26, at 288 (describing obstacles to borrowing against future
earnings potential).
77 Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among
Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 460 (2008); see also Tullio Jappelli et al., Testing
for Liquidity Constraints in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources, 80 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 251, 252 (1998) (explaining that “sample splits based on wealth are bound to be highly
imperfect because assets and asset income are often poorly measured”).
78 See David S. Johnson et al., The Response of Consumer Spending to Rebates During an
Expansion: Evidence from the 2003 Child Tax Credit 2 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~souleles/research/papers/JPSChildTaxCreditApril
2009.pdf.  Until relatively recently, studies of liquidity constraints were largely inconclusive, ow-
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studies showing consumer responses to a predictable, one-time future
spike in income, usually in the form of a tax rebate.79  For a consumer
who could borrow, and expected no other fluctuations in income, the
rational behavior would be to smooth that spike across time—borrow-
ing in order to spend some before the rebate and saving to spend
some after.80  Strikingly, many consumers did not increase spending
much before the spike and then spent a significant amount of their
rebate in the few months afterward.81  In most studies, that pattern
was most pronounced for households with low incomes and low
wealth.82  The pattern held true for those who confirmed that they an-
ing to problems in the available data and difficulties in sorting cause from effect. See Browning
& Lusardi, supra note 37, at 1833–34 (critiquing earlier studies on these grounds); Angela C.
Lyons, How Credit Access Has Changed over Time for U.S. Households, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF.
231, 232–33 (2003) (same); Nicholas S. Souleles, The Response of Household Consumption to
Income Tax Refunds, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 947, 947–48 (1999) (same).
79 Sumit Agarwal et al., The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates—
Evidence from Consumer Credit Data, 115 J. POL. ECON. 986, 987 (2007); David S. Johnson et al.,
Household Expenditures and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1589, 1589
(2006); Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Consumer Response to Tax Rebates, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 381, 381 (2003); Souleles, supra note 78, at 947; Shawn A. Cole et al., Where Does It Go?
Spending by the Financially Constrained 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-083, 2008);
Julia Lynn Coronado et al., The Household Spending Response to the 2003 Tax Cut: Evidence
from Survey Data 1 (Fed. Res. Bd., Working Paper No. 2005-32, 2005); Claudia R. Sahm et al.,
Household Response to the 2008 Tax Rebates: Survey Evidence and Aggregate Implications 1
(Fed. Res. Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-45, 2009); Christian Broda & Jonathan Parker, The
Impact of the 2008 Tax Rebates on Consumer Spending: Preliminary Evidence 1–2 (July 29,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.broda/
website/research/unrestricted/Stimulus%20Payments%20and%20Spending.pdf.
80 See Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 1595.  In some situations, this prediction is not as
robust. See Browning & Lusardi, supra note 37, at 1801.
81 Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 1597; Sahm et al., supra note 79, at 6, 14–15; Broda &
Parker, supra note 79, at 3; Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 9–10.
82 Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 1603, 1604 tbl.5; Souleles, supra note 78, at 956;
Coronado et al., supra note 79, at 12; Broda & Parker, supra note 79, at 3; Johnson et al., supra
note 78, at 14. But see Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 79, at 385 (finding that poorer households
were less likely to spend their rebate than others).  Sahm et al. find a more complex pattern in
which poorer households spent faster but over time spent less of their rebate than the richest.
Sahm et al., supra note 79, at 6–7, 10–11.  The contrary results may be explainable as an aspect of
debt burdens.  Shapiro and Slemrod find that paying off debt far exceeded either spending or
saving for all categories of respondents.  Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 79, at 385 tbl.2.  Paying
off debt may be more important for low-income households.  Since these households have diffi-
culty saving, maintaining an open line of credit is vital to them in surviving future crises. See
ANGUS DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION 197 (1992) (“The precautionary motive for
saving . . . is strengthened by the existence of liquidity constraints.”).  Thus, paying off debt is a
form of saving for future liquidity needs. Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 14 n.19 (arguing
that some observed data can also be explained by the fact that poor households need to accumu-
late a “buffer stock” of savings in the event of future crises).  This story implies that debt repay-
ment is itself evidence that households expect themselves to be liquidity-constrained in the
future. Cf. Gross & Souleles, supra note 74, at 153 (arguing that borrowers’ refusals to use all of
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ticipated the income spike,83 although some data also suggest that
those who were unaware of their rebate did not spend it.84
Similar recent investigations found a strong relationship between
the timing of income tax refunds or minimum wage hikes and the abil-
ity to take out auto loans.85  The authors of these investigations sug-
gest that the key barrier to credit for some households is a down
payment, often quite modest, that lenders demand as security for the
loan.86  The tax refund is a large enough lump to overcome the down-
payment problem, greatly facilitating borrowing for major
purchases.87
In another study of auto loans, a separate set of authors found
different evidence suggestive of liquidity constraints.88  In that case,
lower-income buyers paid premiums for extending their loans over a
longer period of time.89  The inference is that what drives borrowing
behavior for those families is the ability to make monthly loan-service
payments.90  That implies that households cannot borrow infinitely
their credit limits is evidence of liquidity constraints where it is motivated by fear that credit will
be needed more urgently in the future).
83 See Coronado et al., supra note 79, at 1.
84 That is, Coronado et al. find no difference in the marginal propensity to spend out of
either mailed-out rebates or reduced withholding, id. at 1, even though economic theory suggests
that spending out of the mailings should be lower, id. at 20.  But they also report that a smaller
proportion of households knew that they had received a tax benefit delivered through lower
withholding. Id. at 9–10.  That suggests that the lower salience of the withholding may have
depressed spending among the population receiving it, leaving the two populations’ propensities
to spend roughly equivalent.
85 William Adams et al., Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime
Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 49, 59 (2009).
86 Id. at 63; see also Daniel Aaronson et al., The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum
Wage Hikes 23–24 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2007-23, 2008), available at http://
www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2007/wp2007_23.pdf (finding
that increases in the minimum wage rate allow households to buy goods requiring down
payments).
87 Adams et al., supra note 85, at 59.  An average tax refund represents about 6.5 weeks of
net income for a low-income family.  Cole et al., supra note 79, at 1.  For additional evidence on
the importance of rebates in overcoming the down-payment problem, see Souleles, supra note
78, at 954 (explaining how constrained consumers save up for durables), and David W. Wilcox,
Social Security Benefits, Consumption Expenditure, and the Life Cycle Hypothesis, 97 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 303 (1989) (finding that actual receipt of higher Social Security benefits increases
auto purchases, but announcement of benefits increase does not).
88 Orazio P. Attanasio et al., Credit Constraints in the Market for Consumer Durables:
Evidence from Micro Data on Car Loans, 49 INT’L ECON. REV. 401, 402 (2008).
89 See id. at 404.
90 Id. at 406, 427.
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against future income, but instead are constrained by their ability to
make current payments.91
Finally, other research documents the use and availability of
credit cards for income smoothing.  In general, the evidence shows
that many households cannot easily borrow all that they would pre-
fer.92  For instance, when credit limits increase, the carried balances
for significant numbers of cardholders increase.93  But these results of-
fer only limited support for the notion that households are credit-con-
strained in general, rather than simply showing that they are
constrained from using credit cards.  The studies do not generally ob-
serve other forms of household debt,94 so credit balances, or inability
to obtain a card or a higher limit, might still leave a household with
other credit alternatives, albeit alternatives that are perhaps less con-
venient or more expensive.
Overall, most economists interpret these results as evincing sig-
nificant liquidity constraints among poorer households.95  Thus, if
households do not smooth their incomes, it is most likely because they
cannot.  There may also be a complicated story here, however, about
impatience and self-restraint, which we set out shortly.
91 See id. at 433; see also Gross & Souleles, supra note 74, at 168 (offering additional
evidence that higher interest rates limit borrowing).
92 See Agarwal et al., supra note 79, at 1005–07 (describing the effects of rebate on low-
limit credit card holders, and arguing they demonstrate “binding liquidity constraints”); Donald
Cox & Tullio Japelli, The Effect of Borrowing Constraints on Consumer Liabilities, 25 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 197, 198 (1993) (employing a survey to identify borrowers who were denied
credit); Gross & Souleles, supra note 74, at 151–52 (using a data set of credit card use, and
finding that borrowing increases together with limit increases); Lyons, supra note 78, at 248–49
(examining patterns of credit-application denials); James X. Sullivan, Borrowing During Unem-
ployment: Unsecured Debt as a Safety Net, 80 J. HUM. RESOURCES 383, 384–85 (2008) (using
survey data to link spending patterns with periods of unemployment); Cole et al., supra note 79,
at 11–15 (suggesting that high fees paid by taxpayers to accelerate their refunds by a few weeks
indicate that borrowers lack “lower-cost credit alternatives”).
93 Gross & Souleles, supra note 74, at 164 fig.I; Lyons, supra note 78, at 252.
94 E.g., Gross & Souleles, supra note 74, at 159.
95 George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Sim-
ulation, and Empirical Evaluation, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 62–64 (2001); Marianne Bertrand &
Adair Morse, What Do High-Interest Borrowers Do with Their Tax Rebate? 1 (Chi. Booth Sch. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=134489; Jeffrey R.
Campbell & Zvi Hercowitz, Liquidity Constraints of the Middle Class 16 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2009-20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344489.  For yet other
evidence of liquidity constraints, see David Card et al., Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of
Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1511, 1553–55
(2007).
The data also suggests that black households and those headed by unmarried women are
especially constrained. See Lyons, supra note 78, at 241.
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One point worth emphasizing about existing research is that it
fails to examine the poorest households.  Studies of tax rebates, by
definition, can collect data only on those who are entitled to a re-
bate.96  Thus, groups such as retirees with little Social Security in-
come97 and individuals with disabilities may be too poor even to
appear in the research.98  Theory suggests that these kinds of house-
holds would be even more liquidity-constrained,99 but there are no
data to confirm this.
2. Borrowing Against the Rebate
It might be argued that, although poorer families are often liquid-
ity-constrained as a general matter, this problem should disappear
when there is a year-end distribution.  That is, the claim would be that
even the least creditworthy household should be able to borrow
against their expected rebate.  This, however, has not proven true em-
pirically.  Further, theory suggests that intermediaries will capture at
least some of the value of borrowing for highly constrained house-
holds, and the available data bear this out.
The same studies that suggest liquidity constraints generally also
demonstrate that consumers cannot easily borrow, even against a cer-
tain rebate.  Again, most of the studies we mention examine exactly
the situation where the taxpayer was certain to receive her rebate.100
But those studies found incomplete income smoothing, particularly
among poorer households.101  Of course, some failure to borrow might
result from the household’s failure to recognize that the rebate is
coming.102
96 For example, in one experiment, the rebate was only available to working households or
to households with “qualifying” income of at least $3000.  Sahm et al., supra note 79, at 1; see
also Agarwal et al., supra note 79, at 987 n.1 (noting that about 23 million households did not file
an income tax return and so were not covered by their study); Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 4
n.7 (acknowledging that the credit they study flows mostly to families making in excess of
$20,000).
97 In order to qualify for Social Security benefits, an individual must meet certain salary
and years-worked targets, or must be married to an individual who does. See generally SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10035, RETIREMENT BENEFITS (2010) (discussing Social Security benefit
eligibility requirements).
98 Indeed, car loans and credit cards are usually unavailable to the very poor. Cf. Littwin,
supra note 77, at 463 (describing studies on access to credit cards for low-income families).
99 Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 79, at 385.
100 See Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 1592; Sahm et al., supra note 79, at 2.
101 See Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 1603 (discussing spending increases when there are
expected increases in income); Sahm et al., supra note 79, at 6–7 (same).
102 See Coronado et al., supra note 79, at 11 (finding that income tax rebates were a genu-
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Even well-informed families often failed to smooth their rebates,
however, suggesting that liquidity constraints remained an obstacle
despite the certain influx of income.103  There are a number of possible
causes for this problem.  Some individuals might remain poor credit
risks despite a guarantee of income.104  Others might commit the same
funds to multiple creditors, or prove to have more urgent expenses
when their checks arrive.105  Persons who work only part-time or tem-
porary jobs might also be thought to be risks to relocate,106 incurring
more costs in collection than the value of any interest payments.107
Lenders face high fixed costs of verifying all this information, costs
that may be prohibitively high for small loans.108  Thus, since so much
of the likelihood of these kinds of risks will remain known only to the
borrower, market failure due to information asymmetry is likely.109
In some situations, theory would predict that the lending market
would not fail, but that lenders would capture much of the value of
borrowing.  The standard information asymmetry story assumes that
only “low quality” customers—the riskiest borrowers—would accept
ine surprise to more than a quarter of households, and about a third of households in the case of
a payroll tax rebate).
103 See id. at 14–15.
104 Examples include individuals who could file for bankruptcy, or who might quickly spend
their rebate proceeds and render themselves effectively judgment-proof.
105 Cf. KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECO-
NOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2004), available at http://www.responsible
lending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf (finding that
payday borrowers often fail to repay when their paychecks arrive because they must instead pay
“basic living expenses, such as electricity, rent, and groceries”).
106 Cf. Julia J. Bartkowiak, Trends Toward Part-Time Employment: Ethical Issues, 12 J. BUS.
ETHICS 811, 812 (1993) (“A fundamental aspect of the low wage/high turnover model is that
employees are expected to leave the company on a regular basis.”).
107 Cf. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 146 (2004) (noting that
transient workers and undocumented immigrants have difficulty opening bank accounts).
108 Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 864–65
(2007); see Barr, supra note 107, at 155 (explaining that high fees for fringe lenders are associ-
ated in part with costs of origination, follow-up, and loan losses).
109 William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State,
41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 24–27 (1977); Sumit Agarwal et al., Adverse Selection in the
Credit Card Market: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 14–15 (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ushakrisna.com/CreditCardAdvSelection.pdf (explaining that low-income indi-
viduals “have fewer option for acquiring funds to smooth consumption”).  That is, borrowing by
low-asset individuals often produces a “market for lemons.”  Without knowing the riskiness of a
borrower, rational lenders will offer rates only the riskiest borrowers would accept.  Since these
are the only customers the lender attracts, she ends up losing money on many of her loans,
leading her to charge higher rates, which in turn leads to riskier borrowers, and so on.
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the unfavorable rates offered by the uninformed counterparty.110  That
analysis, however, is strictly accurate only at the margin.  Where there
are enough inframarginal high-quality customers,111 lenders should be
able to find a market without driving up their own costs above price.112
The new equilibrium point will fall at an interest rate that looks un-
fair—a price no comparably risky marginal borrower would stomach.
Ordinarily, this possibility would not be of much use to the lender, as
competition and the costs of driving away customers closer to the mar-
gin would make it impractical to price at this high level.
If, however, the lender can charge separate prices to different
portions of the market, it can profit on risky loans without driving
away other customers.113  Modern finance now allows lenders to sepa-
rate borrowers into pools, if not to identify the riskiness of any partic-
ular credit applicant.114  For example, the rise of credit-reporting
agencies has divided consumers between those with established credit
histories and those without.115  Lenders can identify the riskiness of
those with credit histories, while those without—generally those who
are young, poor, or both—remain unknowable and presumptively
risky.116  This bifurcation, together with a looser legal price control
regime, permits lenders to set two tiers of prices, so that they can
charge high rates from high-demand, high-risk borrowers without
driving away the pool of safe bets.117  Market concentration among
110 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informa-
tion, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 402–03 (1981); Agarwal et al., supra note 109, at 3.
111 Inframarginal purchasers are those who are willing to pay more than the equilibrium
price for a good because they value it more than the customer who values it least (the marginal
customer). See IVAN PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 230–31 (3d ed. 2007).
112 That is, although there remain “lemons” in the market, if inframarginal demand is high
enough, the high-demand, high-quality borrowers may be profitable enough to overcome losses
from low-quality borrowers. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
994, 998 (2006) (stating that lending to “fringe” customers is made possible by cross-subsidies
from safe but unknown customers to risky borrowers).
113 See, e.g., Adams et al., supra note 85, at 66–68 (demonstrating that lenders can break
even in the presence of asymmetric information by offering contracts that force borrowers to
reveal their own riskiness, such as through different tiers of down payments).
114 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 108, at 911.
115 JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR 107 (1994); Brooks, supra note 112, at 997–98.
116 Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1511–12
(2006); see Adams et al., supra note 85, at 82 (“[M]odern credit scoring can go a significant
distance toward mitigating adverse selection problems . . . .”).
117 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 116, at 1488, 1516–17 (observing that innovations
in fringe lending practices allow lenders to charge prices that “would have been viewed as usuri-
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lenders, and cognitive or informational challenges to price shopping
among borrowers, would also help to keep borrowing costs high.118
If borrowers are fully rational, the diminishing marginal utility of
wealth might make even these very high-interest loans welfare-in-
creasing, albeit only narrowly.  Because the value of income smooth-
ing is so high at the extreme low end of the income distribution—
where smoothing means survival or not, homelessness or not—it
makes sense that there would be many potential borrowers willing to
pay very high rates of interest.119  For very high demanders, that price
may still increase utility.120  However, the utility those borrowers re-
ceive will be much smaller than what they would have received had
they been able to borrow at a “market” rate—the price of funds avail-
able to those for whom it is easier for the lender to verify
creditworthiness.121  In effect, the lender expropriates what would
have been the borrower’s consumer surplus had there not been mar-
ket failure.122
ous” in an earlier era); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 108, at 889 (explaining that a key develop-
ment allowing bifurcation of the loan market was a legal change allowing very high rates).
118 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8–9
(2008) (arguing that consumers’ “imperfect rationality” reduces price competition among lend-
ers); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 116, at 1525–58 (arguing that cognitive failures allow lend-
ers to exploit low-income borrowers); Brooks, supra note 112, at 1010–11 (noting that
conventional lenders avoid the fringe market, reducing competition for small lenders). But see
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2009) (arguing that increased competition might actually increase ef-
forts to mislead borrowers).
119 Cf. Littwin, supra note 77, at 457–58 (explaining the importance of credit in allowing
low-income families to cope with and even survive crises, and noting that “[t]iming is especially
crucial for low-income families”); Bertrand & Morse, supra note 95, at 2, 10 (finding that certain
payday borrowers use funds to “avoid . . . having the gas connection turned off or to catch up
with late rent payments” and “buy[ ] groceries”).  We are also sympathetic to claims that many
borrowers are not acting rationally at all, but instead are making serious mistakes that reduce
their own subjective well-being. E.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 116, at 1489–90.  Markets
may contain a mix of rational and irrational actors. See Bar-Gill, supra note 118, at 1123–24.
Indeed, we believe that mistaken borrowing can be a serious problem for tax rebates, as we
elaborate. See infra Part III.G.  For now our only point is that, even if all borrowers are fully
rational, there is still a strong basis for government intervention.
120 See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 108, at 885 (suggesting that some borrowers who pay
high fees are acting rationally and use funds to “purchase food or medicine”).
121 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 156 (5th ed. 1989).
122 Cf. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Slight of Hand:
Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1126–27 (2008)
(“[P]ayday lending has proven wildly profitable.”).
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Thus, allowing lenders to price for these inframarginal borrowers
means that borrowers give up huge utility123 in order to enrich the
shareholders of lenders by a comparatively nominal amount.  As we
will describe, government interventions that made borrowing easier
for these kinds of poor households would therefore increase social
welfare by large amounts at relatively little cost in absolute dollars.124
Other research confirms that there is a market for loans to very
poor borrowers, but only at exorbitant interest rates.125  Many tax re-
turn preparers offer customers entitled to a tax refund expedited ac-
cess to the funds in exchange for several small fees, each in the range
of $30 to $135.126  Because the client only receives her money a few
weeks early, the effective annual rate of interest paid on these loans
averages between 150% and 300%,127 although prices have come
down slightly in the past few years.128  Similarly, so-called “payday
lenders” will advance money to borrowers on the condition that the
borrowers allow the lenders to automatically debit their accounts on
the date of the next paychecks.129  Here, too, nominal fees are modest
but, over the course of a year, translate to effective interest rates of
300% or higher.130  Other forms of credit, such as pawnshop loans, can
carry effective rates as high as 1000%.131  In one study, the receipt of a
tax rebate reduced taxpayers’ uses of these other forms of borrowing,
strongly implying that no other cheaper sources of credit were availa-
ble for the household.132
3. Impatience
It should be noted at this point that the evidence on liquidity con-
straints can also be interpreted to imply that year-end rebates would
increase welfare for some households.  Failure to smooth an expected
revenue spike might be the product not of externally imposed limits
123 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 116, at 1489–90.
124 See infra Part IV.B.
125 See Bertrand & Morse, supra note 95, at 1.
126 CHI CHI WU & JEAN ANN FOX, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., CONSUMER FED’N
OF AM., COMING DOWN: FEWER REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS, LOWER PRICES FROM SOME
PROVIDERS, BUT QUICKIE TAX REFUND LOANS STILL BURDEN THE WORKING POOR 8–12
(2008); Barr, supra note 107, at 168–69.
127 Barr, supra note 107, at 169.
128 WU & FOX, supra note 126, at 4.
129 Barr, supra note 107, at 149.  For an overview of the industry, see generally CASKEY,
supra note 115, at 36–67.
130 Barr, supra note 107, at 154–55.
131 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 108, at 892.
132 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 95, at 1.
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on borrowing, but instead of deliberate choices to save.133  At first
glance, the savings story is hard to reconcile with data that households
spent much of their rebate paying down debt,134 and that many were
willing to pay very high effective rates of interest to accelerate the
receipt of the rebate.135  The savings story also is puzzling for families
that spent some of their rebate on what looked like luxuries, such as
vacations and apparel.136  Although it would be strange to defer con-
sumption of essentials to save for luxuries, it may be more sensible for
certain impatient households—families who struggle to save and know
it.  Those families might use the delayed tax rebate as a way of forcing
themselves to overcome impatience.137  We return to these issues in
Part III.
B. Low Salience of Energy Costs
Another factor that may contribute to imperfect smoothing is
households’ possible failures to recognize the increased costs of a con-
sumption tax.  Because consumption taxes are likely to be relatively
“low salience,” or “hidden,” families might be surprised by budgets
that prove tighter than expected, leaving less money available for top
priorities.138  In addition to compounding the budget woes of those
who are liquidity-constrained, salience also affects borrowing.  For ex-
ample, a taxpayer who does not know she will get a refund at the end
of the year will not think to borrow against it.
1. Welfare Costs of Hidden Taxes
In the classic household budgeting model, families know how
much each of their options costs when they decide how to divide up
their limited funds.139  The model therefore assumes that within each
133 See Fennell & Stark, supra note 13, at 19–20 (explaining that what look like failures to
smooth may be the product of deliberate but unusual preferences); Johnson et al., supra note 78,
at 14 n.19 (noting that their data can also be interpreted as evidence of households deliberately
choosing to accumulate a “buffer stock” against uncertain future outcomes).
134 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
135 See Cole et al., supra note 79, at 11–13.
136 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 95, at 7–8; Broda & Parker, supra note 79, at 3–4.
137 See Angeletos et al., supra note 95, at 49; see also Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko,
Paying to Save: Tax Withholding Among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers 2–4 (Aug. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (considering this argument).
138 For a review of the empirical evidence on whether transactional consumption taxes are
more difficult for shoppers to detect, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59,
72–77 (2009).
139 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (explaining the rational planning model of economic behavior).
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time period families allocate their money first to the highest priority
items, and then to the next highest, and so on, until the budget is ex-
hausted.140  That technique maximizes the family’s welfare—every
item purchased produces more utility than any item that was not.141
There is recent evidence, however, that consumers sometimes do
not know the true prices they are paying.  For instance, in one study,
people bought less of a good when the sales tax was computed for
them and displayed on the shelf.142
We expect, though, that carbon pricing will not be hidden in pre-
cisely the same manner as other sales taxes.  Producers of energy-in-
tensive products will likely charge higher prices to reflect their own
higher carbon expense, meaning that much of the cost of carbon will
be included in the prices faced by consumers.  Utility companies might
well include carbon taxes directly in each household’s monthly bill.
Thus, in many instances, consumers will be able to see the after-tax
price when they make a consumption decision.  But when a consumer
must make a decision before seeing the price tag—such as in the first
month after a new energy tax is enacted—she might face some tempo-
rary difficulties in making the right decision.143
Planning for budget shortfalls is also likely to be challenging in
scenarios where the size of the expected tax is very difficult to predict.
Studies suggest that many people cannot predict accurately their own
willpower and, instead, overestimate their own future restraint.144
Carbon taxes (and their cap-and-trade equivalents) fall more heavily
on households that use large amounts of carbon-intensive products.
Willpower—the ability to put on a sweater, to bike instead of drive, to
turn off the television—will be a significant determinant of the
amount of tax the household pays.  More generally, for any consump-
tion tax, the resolution to save instead of spend allows a household to
140 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice The-
oretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Work-
ing Paper No. 13737, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086
986.
141 See id. at 24.
142 Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145,
1146 (2009).
143 Cf. Littwin, supra note 77, at 477–78 (describing how poor women learn techniques for
managing tight finances, and noting that these techniques are imperiled by rapid changes in
household finance).
144 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 217,
218–19 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1209 (2003).
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defer paying tax, giving them the benefit of the time value of the taxes
they save.  Consequently, if families are bad at predicting whether
they will be able to exert willpower, they will also be unable to esti-
mate their tax.
Finally on this point, households may struggle to make accurate
tax-avoiding investment decisions.  One of the objectives of a carbon
tax is to encourage households to invest in energy-efficient appliances
and lifestyles.145  In order to decide, however, whether to spend an
extra $500 for a new air conditioner, a family must have a fairly de-
tailed sense of the expected future cost savings.  In particular, the fam-
ily must know that there is a shortfall in their monthly budget
attributable to energy costs, calculate how much of the shortfall the
investment would eliminate, and then discount that future savings to
its present value.  Our claim about hidden taxes is that these kinds of
calculations are either beyond the capacity of some households or are
perceived not to be worth the mental effort of engaging in them.146
There may also be a significant procrastination component to a tax-
payer’s unwillingness to think about the cost-effectiveness of her
investments.147
These hidden taxes and other low-salience costs may have a nega-
tive impact on household welfare.  Chetty et al. argue that hidden
taxes potentially interfere with a family’s budget allocation process.148
Suppose the Ericsson family believes that heating their house this
month will cost $100, but after tax they ultimately pay $110.  That $10
shortfall must come from somewhere else in the monthly budget.  If
the Ericssons do not notice the $10 gap until the end of the month,
they may find themselves without enough money to pay rent or buy
the last week’s groceries.  If so, they likely would have been better off
putting on sweaters and paying a smaller utility bill.
The hidden tax problem is more acute for the poorest families.
Theory and empirics to date are unclear on whether taxes are more
hidden from rich or poor households.149  But unexpected costs are a
greater danger to highly illiquid households; liquid households sur-
145 Stephen H. Schneider & Lawrence H. Goulder, Achieving Low-Cost Emissions Targets,
389 NATURE 13, 13 (1997).
146 See Galle, supra note 138, at 85–89.
147 This will be explored in more detail in Part III.F.
148 See Chetty et al., supra note 142, at 1175–76.
149 Galle, supra note 138, at 100–04.  That is, while wealthier taxpayers can acquire infor-
mation about taxes more readily, the impact of a tax on them is smaller than it is on poorer
individuals, which reduces their incentive to acquire information.  So it is ambiguous which ef-
fect prevails.
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prised by their energy bill can always put the groceries on a credit
card.150  Wealthier households also have a larger margin for error;
when the family is already purchasing luxuries, an extra $100 per
month is easier to absorb out of lower-priority items.151
In sum, if consumption taxes are at least somewhat hidden from
consumers, they may prevent some households from smoothing their
incomes over the course of the year.  That is very likely to result in
greater welfare losses for households that cannot smooth than for
those that can.
Additionally, as others have recognized, hidden Pigouvian taxes
lead to additional social loss.152  The point of the Pigouvian tax is to
change behavior by impounding the negative consumption externality
of a good into its price.153  But if consumers do not notice the tax, they
do not reduce their usage of the good; in the case of a carbon tax, they
do not reduce carbon emissions.154
2. Learning
It might be argued in response to these points that hidden taxes
are, at worst, a short-term problem because households will quickly
learn that their costs are higher than expected.155  Alternatively, li-
quidity-constrained households might learn to avoid the worst kinds
of credit, diminishing the extent to which the surplus from income
smoothing would be diverted to lenders.  While both of these are the-
oretically possible, based on available evidence, it is more likely that
learning would be slow and partial, leaving many families vulnerable
for extended periods.
Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren have explained why learning
can be ineffective in the credit market.156  Consumers who do not un-
derstand credit may also be unaware of their need to educate them-
selves, be unable to comprehend new information, believe (wrongly)
that the costs of learning outweigh the benefits, or expect that they
can free ride on the information-gathering efforts of others.157  Educa-
150 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 118, at 64.
151 Galle, supra note 138, at 101.
152 Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969, 981–82
(2009).
153 See supra text accompanying note 21.
154 See Ekins & Barker, supra note 20, at 77.
155 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 138–42 (2000)
(making this argument about credit card users).
156 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 118, at 11–25; Bar-Gill, supra note 118, at 1128–29.
157 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 118, at 12–14.
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tion by interested third parties, such as consumer advocacy groups,
may be difficult in part because of these same factors, but also because
of the highly differentiated nature of credit.158  Whether a loan is a
good deal or not depends on how the household behaves, its tolerance
for risk, and the exact features of the loan.159  It is very hard for out-
siders to gather this kind of information about millions of families.160
Similarly, competitors would also struggle to educate potential cus-
tomers sufficiently and might prefer not to, in any event, either in or-
der to prey on the misinformed or alternatively out of fear that their
rivals would capture any gains from education.161  Bar-Gill and War-
ren also round up empirical evidence to support their theory: learning
in the credit market is slow, and people who do learn often forget
their lessons over time.162
As one of us has also detailed elsewhere, many of these same
factors apply to learning about hidden taxes.163  In addition, taxpayers
often fail to make use of hints and clues about their own misjudg-
ments, not only because household finance is complex and therefore
these signals are “noisy,” but also due to people’s tendencies to per-
ceive evidence as confirming rather than disproving what they already
believe.164  The fact that taxes are and remain hidden also seems to
explain several features of our national tax system;165 if learning about
hidden taxes were easy, it would be difficult to understand why these
features have persisted over time.
C. Prebates Raise Similar Problems
Switching from rebates to prebates does not eliminate the diffi-
culties just described, although accelerating payment does somewhat
change the nature of the problem.  For one thing, a prebate may still
158 See id. at 14–17.  Additionally, peer-to-peer learning may be slowed by the self-interest
of informed peers.  John Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1586–88 (2006).
159 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 118, at 16, 24–25 (discussing the importance of use
patterns).
160 Id. at 16.  Similarly, where individual factors are important, families cannot easily learn
just by observing others. See Browning & Lusardi, supra note 37, at 1846.
161 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 118, at 18–19.
162 See id. at 26–56.  For similar surveys of persistent household ignorance in personal fi-
nance decisions, see Alexander L. Brown et al., Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic
Saving Experiments, 124 Q.J. ECON. 197, 200 (2009); Campbell, supra note 158, at 1579–85,
1588–89.
163 See Galle, supra note 138, at 89–93.
164 Id. at 90.
165 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got It Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax
Economics 5–6 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2777, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1476210.
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require costly income smoothing; instead of borrowing, the family
now must save its money and use it to offset higher energy costs
throughout the year.  More generally, a lump-sum regime, whether in
the form of a rebate or prebate, will fail to put poor and wealthy
households on the same footing if the costs of smoothing consumption
are greater for the poor.  This will hold whenever the poor have to pay
more to borrow or save, or are unable to do so.
In order to smooth consumption in a prebate regime, poor house-
holds will need saving technologies available that make it easier for
them to save.  If these are not available or have higher transaction
costs than those available to wealthier households, then the poor will
once again be at a relative disadvantage.166  Although evidence here is
less extensive than in borrowing, the data still suggest that many poor
households have no access to conventional banking.167  Instead, the
poor use risky or expensive substitutes.168
For similar reasons, the hidden nature of consumption tax re-
gimes will also affect households who receive prebates.  In order to
make optimal consumption and saving decisions, a household has to
be able to incorporate information about the hidden tax regime, and
do so in a timely fashion.169  For instance, households may not realize
that prebates are designed to offset increased energy costs.  They may
then fail to save enough to cover those costs later, again resulting in
budget surprises that reduce welfare.
D. Summary
On the whole, it appears so far that, as presently designed, many
forms of transfers aimed at making consumption taxes more progres-
sive are seriously flawed.  To achieve distributional neutrality of wel-
fare, and not simply of annual income, rebates and prebates must
account not only for how much but also when households spend.  But,
as we have shown, smoothing consumption is neither cheap nor guar-
anteed.  Compared to their wealthier counterparts, poor households
pay more to borrow and get less when they save—a disadvantage ex-
acerbated in turn by the hidden nature of a transactional consumption
tax.
166 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
167 Barr, supra note 107, at 130–32; Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional
Determinants of Saving: Implications for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J.
SOCIO-ECON. 457, 466–67 (1999).
168 Barr, supra note 107, at 124.
169 See Chetty et al., supra note 142, at 1145–48, 1174 (explaining the household budgeting
process under uncertainty about tax rates).
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III. HYPERBOLIC HOUSEHOLDS AND THE LIMITS OF
REIMBURSEMENT REGIMES
So far, in establishing that the timing and frequency of reimburse-
ments matters, we have assumed that households are impatient; they
discount costs and benefits that are in the future.  Importantly, we also
have assumed that a household’s discounting remains constant over
time.  Constant discounting guarantees that—barring new informa-
tion—a household’s long-term and short-term preferences will always
coincide, a result that rules out self-control problems, such as overcon-
sumption and procrastination.170
In this Part, we relax this time-consistency assumption.  Evidence
from numerous experiments and field studies by economists—not to
mention simple intuition and common sense—suggests that many peo-
ple come to regret their impatience or procrastination, so that their ex
ante preferences are inconsistent with their sentiments after the dam-
age is done.171  We show that the shortcomings of lump-sum payout
regimes identified in Part II become more pronounced once one al-
lows for time-inconsistent households.  Time inconsistency gets in the
way of smoothing, leading households to save too little in a prebate
regime or to procrastinate borrowing against an expected rebate.
Moreover, the incentive to procrastinate will extend to two other im-
portant investment decisions: when to purchase more energy-efficient
durable goods, such as appliances, automobiles, and home insulation,
and when to acquire information about the impact of the tax and need
to smooth consumption.  More generally, we also show that, even if
poor and rich households have identical self-control problems, the
poor will fare worse on average due to their tighter budget constraints
and the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Parts III.A and III.B provide a general overview of the quasi-
hyperbolic model applied in the remainder of Part III; those familiar
with the model can safely proceed to Part III.C.
A. Intertemporal Decisions and the Evidence on Time Inconsistency
An intertemporal decision is one in which the costs and rewards
that flow from the decision are not all incurred or received in the same
170 See George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evi-
dence and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573, 573–78 (1992) (describing the differences be-
tween the prediction of the standard discounting model and observed instances of
overconsumption and procrastination).
171 See infra text accompanying notes 172–89.
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time period.172  The relative timing of costs and rewards matters be-
cause, as a general matter, people are impatient in that they prefer to
receive benefits as early as possible and delay incurring costs until fu-
ture periods.173  A rational actor will choose her behavior to maximize
the sum of her current and future well-being.174  This can be modeled
using an intertemporal utility function that sums up the instantaneous
utility (the payoffs) in each relevant time period as discounted to ac-
count for an actor’s time preference.175  Early work in formalizing in-
tertemporal choice used an exponential discount function, which,
while easier to use, has an important (but, in hindsight, undesirable)
side effect: it implies that actors have a constant level of impatience.176
In short, an exponential discounter will never give added weight to
immediate costs and rewards, and thus will always act in a time-consis-
tent manner.177  But there is a large body of empirical evidence show-
ing that people routinely exhibit time-inconsistent preferences,
stemming from a short-term preference for immediate gratification
that leads them to override their long-term preferences.178  It is this
asymmetry between long-term and short-term impatience that leads
people to procrastinate and overconsume.179
The principal challenge to the time-consistency assumption of
neoclassical theory originated in a series of experiments finding that
172 George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 181, 181 (1989).
173 Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 170, at 573.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 162, 166–67 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2007) (stating
that the exponential function is the only one that ensures that actors will exhibit constant levels
of impatience).
177 Id. at 170 (“Constant discounting implies that a person’s intertemporal preferences are
time-consistent, which means that later preferences ‘confirm’ earlier preferences.”).
178 See, e.g., id. at 172–79; Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 172, at 183–87.
179 Importantly, economists embraced exponential discounting because it made their mod-
els more tractable mathematically, not because they believed that real-world actors use exponen-
tial functions. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 11 (1996) (“The assumption of
consistent preferences is clearly not a literal description of much actual behavior . . . but it is an
extremely useful simplification of behavior.”); Frederick et al., supra note 176, at 167 (noting
that earlier economists adopted the model for its ease of use, not its accuracy).  Unlike the large
body of evidence supporting the time-inconsistency assumption, there is no systematic evidence
finding that people have constant discount rates. See Warren K. Bickel & Matthew W. Johnson,
Delay Discounting: A Fundamental Behavioral Process of Drug Dependence, in TIME AND DECI-
SION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE, supra note
144 (stating that “[e]xponential discounting . . . has not been empirically supported by behavioral
research” conducted in humans and animals); see also infra Part III.C (describing evidence that
real-world actors have declining discount rates).
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people value immediate gratification and therefore exhibit declining,
instead of constant, discount rates.180  In short, people discount imme-
diate payoffs more steeply than they discount those same payoffs from
a long-term perspective.181  A common type of experiment to test
whether people have time-inconsistent preferences asks subjects to
choose between a smaller, earlier reward and a higher, delayed one,
where in some instances the smaller reward can be received immedi-
ately and in others both the smaller and larger rewards are delayed
until future periods.182
In an early study, the economist Richard Thaler told subjects to
imagine that they had won a lottery and could choose either to receive
the money immediately or leave it in the bank earning interest.183  He
then asked them how much interest they would require to make them
indifferent between receiving $15 immediately or in three, twelve, and
thirty-six months.184  The required median returns were $30, $60, and
$100, which translates into continuously compounded discount rates
of 277%, 139%, and 63% for the three, twelve, and thirty-six month
delays, respectively.185  As can be seen, the implicit discount rate de-
clined as the delay in receiving the money increased; the sooner sub-
jects could get their money, the more impatient they were for it.186
B. Overconsumption and Procrastination
It is helpful to compare the way that time-consistent households
(“TC households”) and time-inconsistent households (“TI house-
holds”) make intertemporal decisions.  We will assume that a house-
hold will choose a consumption path that takes into account its long-
term impatience, as captured by a discount factor, d.  Moreover, the
decisions of TI households will also be affected by their preference for
immediate gratification, as captured by a short-term discount factor, b,
180 See, e.g., GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 63–80 (1992) (describing evidence of de-
clining discount rates and using hyperbolas to model them).
181 See id. at 64 fig.3.2 (illustrating that as the time-delay increases, people require a higher
reward value); Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption,
in ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 258, 258 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds.,
2003) (explaining that generalized hyperbolic discount functions decline at a faster rate in the
short-run than in the long-run, matching a key feature of experimental data); Loewenstein &
Prelec, supra note 170, at 579–81 (setting forth the hyperbolic discount function).
182 See RICHARD H. THALER, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in
QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 127, 128 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 129.
185 Id. at 130 tbl.2.
186 Id. at 129.
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set to less than 1.  It is applicable only when the household is making a
short-term decision: it either has to incur an immediate cost or grab an
immediate reward.
From the long-term perspective of period 0, when all costs and
benefits are delayed, both types discount future payoffs using a stan-
dard exponential function.  That is, from the perspective of period 0, a
TC household will choose the future course of action that will maxi-
mize the sum of its instantaneous utility in periods 1 through n: du1 +
d2u2 + d3u3 + . . . dnun.  A TI household will reach the same exact con-
clusion, since in period 0, it discounts periods 1 through n by du1 + d2u2
+ d3u3 + . . . dnun, which reduces to the standard exponential function.
However, in period 1, the TC household will act to maximize: u1 +
du2 + d2u3 + . . . dn-1un, while its TI counterpart will maximize u1 + du2 +
d2u3 + . . . dn-1un.  Since bd < d, in period 1, the TI household will give
greater weight to the instantaneous utility, u1, than would its TC coun-
terpart or its own previous self.  That is, given its preference for imme-
diate gratification, the TI household will value present utility more
now than it did from the long-term perspective of period 0.  As we will
now see, if that immediate utility is a benefit, a TI household will have
a greater incentive to overconsume.  If the immediate utility is a cost,
the TI household has a greater incentive to procrastinate.
1. Overconsumption Scenario: Immediate Benefits and
Delayed Costs
Smoking, eating tasty but unhealthy foods, indulging in one’s
youth instead of saving for retirement—all require a tradeoff between
an immediate benefit and delayed consequences.  We will refer to a
consumption scenario as one in which a household can grab an imme-
diate benefit, but doing so triggers a cost that it will bear in the future.
We will also say that a household overconsumes whenever it has a
long-term preference to abstain, but makes one or more short-term
decisions to override that preference, solely due to the added weight it
gives to immediate gratification.  It follows that TC households will
never overconsume in this manner because, in TC households, short-
term decisions are consistent with long-term preferences.
More formally, suppose that consuming in period 1 provides an
immediate benefit, v1, but triggers a delayed cost in the following pe-
riod, c2.  From the perspective of period 0, TC and TI households will
both decide not to consume in period 1 whenever v1 + dc2 < 0.  Since
TC households give no added weight to immediate gratification, they
will keep to their plan, but their TI counterparts will override their
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original decision whenever v1 + bdc2 = 0 (assuming that it consumes if
it is indifferent).  Moreover, it follows that, all other things being
equal, a household’s incentive to overconsume will increase the higher
the immediate benefits and the greater its preference for immediate
gratification.
2. Procrastination Scenario: Immediate Costs and
Delayed Benefits
An investment scenario is one in which an actor has to incur a
cost in the present to create a future benefit: exercising, writing a pa-
per, getting a divorce, entering into a contract, or acquiring informa-
tion to reduce transactional risks.  A household procrastinates when it
has a long-term preference to complete task A in period t, but makes
one or more short-term decisions to delay doing so, solely due to the
added weight it gives to the immediate costs it must incur to complete
A.
Suppose that completing A in period 1 requires an immediate in-
vestment of c1, yielding a reward in period 2, v2.  From the perspective
of period 0, TC and TI households will both decide to complete A in
period 1 whenever c1 + dv2 = 0.  TI households, however, will choose
to procrastinate whenever c1 + bdv2 < 0.  As with overconsumption,
households are more likely to procrastinate the higher the immediate
costs of completing A and the greater their short-term impatience.
3. Repeated Overconsumption and Procrastination
At any one point, a household will be guided by its overall goal of
maximizing the sum of its current and future welfare.  In order to do
this, it will have to predict how it expects to act in the future.  It fol-
lows that TI households must try to predict the short-term discount
factor that they expect to use in future periods when making short-
term consumption and investment decisions.
More formally, at time t, a household will try to predict the b that
it will use at t + 1.  If we let bˆ be its prediction, then a correct predic-
tion is one in which bˆ = b.  Such a sophisticated household will make a
correct assessment of its future propensity to overconsume and pro-
crastinate, and adopt commitment devices to assure that it keeps to its
long-term preferences.187  On the other hand, a naı¨ve household is one
187 Commitment devices are mechanisms that restrict an actor’s ability to yield to the pull
of immediate gratification.  More generally, a commitment device is a type of externally imposed
self-regulation mechanism adopted to overcome self-control problems when relying on internal
sources of self-regulation is not sufficient. See ROY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL:
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that period after period incorrectly believes that in the future it will
exhibit perfect self-control—that is, it believes that it will act in a
time-consistent manner and thus has a bˆ = 1, notwithstanding the fact
that it has a b < 1.  It follows that naı¨ve households will repeatedly
overconsume and procrastinate, believing each time that they are do-
ing so for the last time.  It is unlikely that actual households are com-
pletely naı¨ve or sophisticated.188  More likely, they know that they
have a preference for immediate gratification—a b < 1—but are
overly optimistic of their future willpower.189  A partially naı¨ve house-
hold is one that has b < bˆ < 1.  Importantly, even a relatively small
misprediction can lead partially naı¨ve households to repeatedly over-
consume or procrastinate—i.e., to act in the same way as if it were
fully naı¨ve.
We will now lay out the implications of these findings for a con-
sumption tax reimbursement regime.
C. Overconsumption in Prebate Regime
On its face, a lump-sum payment at the beginning of the year
seems like a plausible mechanism to achieve tax neutrality.  Because
the poor household receives the prebate before incurring the tax lia-
bility, it will not have to borrow, as in the case of a rebate.  Nonethe-
less, in order to smooth consumption—to use the prebate to pay the
carbon taxes as they become due—the poor household will have to
save.  We now show that, all other things being equal, TI households
will consume the prebate faster than TC households and thus faster
than they want to from a long-term perspective.  It follows that TI
households that are liquidity-constrained will overconsume carbon
products at the beginning of the year and be forced to cut back once
they have gone through the prebate funds.  Moreover, under a pre-
bate regime, TI households that are not liquidity constrained will
overconsume at the beginning of the year and continue down their
long-term consumption path the rest of the year.  In short, a prebate
can have the perverse effect of leading some households to overcon-
HOW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 6–7 (1994) (describing the ability among
human beings “to exert control over one’s own inner states, processes, and responses” and defin-
ing “self-regulation” as “any effort by a human being to alter its own responses” so as to over-
ride the push to act in ways that diverge from what they really want).
188 See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 121 (2001) (developing a model of partially naı¨ve households).
189 See id. at 150 (suggesting that earlier findings support a model of optimism about future
willpower).
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sume carbon products, which goes against the basic goal of reducing
consumption.
1. Smoothing Problem: Liquidity-Constrained Households
In order to focus on the overconsumption problem, it is helpful to
limit our attention to a prebate regime in which households receive
the funds on December 31st and make a long-term plan setting forth
how much electricity to consume during the coming year, keeping all
other liabilities fixed.  We begin with households that are liquidity-
constrained; if they run out of funds before the year is through, they
will have no other choice but to cut back their electric consumption.190
To simplify matters, we will assume that they receive a prebate of
$1200 and decide to consume the same amount of electric power each
month, leading to a monthly tax liability of $100.  In other words, in
order to maximize their intertemporal utility over the whole year, the
household needs to smooth their electricity consumption.  While they
anticipate that this consumption plan will require sacrifices—using
fans instead of air conditioning and blankets instead of electric heat-
ers—they believe that it is the one that will minimize these shortfalls
in utility.
Consider a TC versus a TI household.  To isolate the effect of
short-term discounting, assume that they both have a long-term dis-
count factor, d = 1 (which does not affect the general results in any
way), and the TI household has a short-term discount factor, b = 0.5.
Each time they use electricity, they receive an immediate benefit—
e.g., using air conditioning instead of a fan—but each month that they
spend more than $100 in taxes (the “excess carbon”), they trigger a
delayed cost, borne in the following months when they are forced to
consume less electricity than they had wanted.  Let v1 = $500 be the
immediate benefits of consuming more electricity than the allotted
monthly amount, and c1 = $900 the delayed cost of exceeding the allot-
ment—i.e., due to the electricity shortfall after the household has ex-
hausted the prebate.  From the long-term perspective of December
31st, both households will plan to keep to the allotment given that
$500 + (- $900) < 0.  But while the TC household keeps to its optimal
consumption plan, come January, its TI counterpart does not because
it now compares an immediate benefit of $500 with a delayed, dis-
counted cost of 0.5 × $900 = $450.  While this is a relatively simple
example, it does provide the underlying intuition: all other things be-
190 See supra Part II.A.
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ing equal, a TI household will go through the prebate funds sooner
than what it believes is optimal.  Additionally, policymakers who fail
to take this into account, and instead adopt the standard time-consis-
tency assumption, will fail to realize the way that the prebate can dis-
tort the consumption decisions of real households.191
As we saw above, a fully sophisticated household will anticipate
its future propensity to overconsume and adopt commitment devices
if available and affordable.192  On the other hand, since naı¨ve house-
holds always conclude that in the future they will act in a time-consis-
tent manner, they will overconsume each month, believing that they
are doing so for the last time, and will go without electricity once they
have exhausted the prebate funds.  For example, suppose that a par-
tially naı¨ve household has a bˆ = 0.556, which is a relatively small mis-
prediction, given that its true b = 0.5.  That household will nonetheless
overconsume each month, since it believes incorrectly that it will later
decide that it will keep to its consumption plan—i.e., (0.556 × $900) =
$500.40 > $500.
There is evidence that households behave in this manner with re-
spect to other lump-sum payments, e.g., food stamps and Social Secur-
ity benefits.193  Shapiro found that caloric intake in households
receiving food stamps declines as the month goes on, and after consid-
ering various possible explanations, opted for one similar to our pre-
bate explanation; sufficiently naı¨ve TI households will overconsume
earlier in the month and have to curtail their food consumption as the
month progresses.194  There is also evidence that purchases tend to in-
crease on paydays, particularly for leisure goods that provide an im-
mediate benefit, including food, alcohol, and drugs.195  And, most on
191 In technical terms, this change in behavior can be thought of as representing both in-
come and substitution effects.  The TI household perceives itself as wealthier because it believes
the future costs of indulging are lower, expanding its budget constraint.  Under a prebate regime,
or for households that are not liquidity-constrained that expect a rebate, there is also an actual
increase in wealth in the amount of the reimbursement.  Additionally, there is a substitution
effect, as the household shifts its consumption towards tempting goods—goods whose costs are
delayed and which therefore seem cheaper per unit than other consumption choices.  The reim-
bursement does not contribute to this second effect, but the added wealth represented by the
reimbursement enlarges its impact.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 186–87.
193 See Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp
Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 303, 315–16 (2005); see also Bertrand & Morse, supra note 95,
at 7–9 (finding that taxpayers whose other behavior suggests a susceptibility to “temptation” are
most likely to spend their tax rebate on indulgences rather than paying bills).
194 See Shapiro, supra note 193, at 321–22.
195 See Carlos Dobkin & Steven Puller, The Effects of Government Transfers on Monthly
Cycles in Drug Abuse, Hospitalization and Mortality, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2137, 2145–49 (2007);
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point for this Article, Ayres et al. found that energy consumption rises
on Fridays (after controlling for weather and other likely causal fac-
tors),196 which could be explained by a payday effect.
2. Overconsumption: Non-Liquidity-Constrained Households
Suppose now that the TI household is not liquidity-constrained; if
in any month it does not have enough cash to consume the monthly
allotment of electricity, it can meet that shortfall by borrowing.  Bor-
rowing, however, is expensive.197  Thus, assume that, given finance
costs, a household will want to borrow to meet the allotment shortfall,
but no more.  In other words, the immediate utility of consuming the
whole allotment of electricity is sufficiently high to meet the delayed
finance costs.
More specifically, assume that to pay for the full monthly allot-
ment, a household will have to borrow funds and incur a delayed fi-
nance charge of $2000, and that the utility of consuming that full
allotment translates to $1200.  From a long-term perspective, a TI
household with a b = 0.5 will want to avoid the finance charges, but,
given its short-term preferences, it will ultimately find it worthwhile to
borrow the funds.  Under this scenario, the TI household will start the
year with a long-term preference never to exceed the monthly allot-
ment of electricity.  Nonetheless, if one continues to work with the
numbers from the example above, this household will overconsume
during the early part of the year, and when it has exhausted the pre-
bate, will borrow to meet the shortfall.  It will do so even though bor-
rowing funds creates a welfare loss that it had wanted to avoid.198
Unconstrained and impatient households not only reduce their
own welfare, but may also frustrate the goals of the carbon tax.  Li-
quidity-constrained households can only overconsume for as long as
Melvin Stephens Jr., “3rd of the Month”: Do Social Security Recipients Smooth Consumption
Between Checks?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 406, 419 (2003); David Huffman & Matias Barenstein,
Riches to Rags Every Month? The Fall in Consumption Expenditures Between Paydays (Inst. for
the Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 1430, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636
622.  It should be noted that while all these sources find a pattern that can be explained, at least
in part, due to time inconsistency, the authors provide a number of possible explanations.
196 Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison
Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 11 fig.8 (July 16, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434950.  For yet more evidence that impatience im-
pairs savings, see Brown et al., supra note 162, at 199.
197 See supra Part II.A.2.
198 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit
Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 415 (2009) (offering evidence that credit cards may
lead to overconsumption out of impatience).
72 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:33
they have access to funds.  Unconstrained households can borrow to
continue their overconsumption.  Thus, the unconstrained households
have a greater capacity to increase carbon emissions.
Finally, time inconsistency can be compounded by poor planning.
So far we have assumed that the household can accurately predict the
amount of electricity that it will want to consume in each month.  In
reality, the household will face unforeseen shocks—a summer far
warmer or winter far colder than usual—and will have to adjust its
consumption plan accordingly.199  Given their liquidity constraints,
households will want to guard against unexpected contingencies by
saving during months with unforeseen lower consumption needs.
However, TI households that give in to temptation and overconsume
will save less than optimal during those months, which will put them in
a more precarious position when outside shocks lead them to prefer
using a greater amount of energy than they had anticipated.
D. Procrastination and Consumption Smoothing
While the impulse to overconsume has relatively straightforward
implications for a prebate, procrastination behaviors interact with a
tax reimbursement regime in several complex ways.  First, as we ex-
plain in this Section, procrastination may impact the extent to which
households smooth their consumption over time.  In Parts III.E and
III.F, we note two other effects of procrastination: lower investments
in carbon-reducing technologies and lower investments in learning
about the tax’s incentives to reduce carbon consumption.200
Time inconsistency compounds the obstacles to consumption
smoothing we surveyed in Part II.  TI households may fail to smooth
consumption because they repeatedly procrastinate borrowing or sav-
ing funds.  These two types of financial transactions require house-
holds to expend time and effort, along with a myriad of other
transaction costs, including comparing intermediaries, identifying
transactional hazards, and disclosing information that they prefer to
keep quiet, such as their immigration status.201  While all of these costs
are incurred immediately, the benefits from smoothing are not all re-
199 The ambient temperature at the time households plan may itself distort planning.  Peo-
ple tend to mispredict their future preferences because when they project, they give undue
weight to their current state when making such predictions.  For example, someone who has just
had a large breakfast may order a light lunch because she projects her current sated state in
trying to ascertain how hungry she will feel by lunch. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 144, at
1209–10 (discussing projection bias).
200 See infra Part III.E–.F.
201 See Barr, supra note 107, at 134–35 (discussing the transaction costs of borrowing).
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ceived immediately.202  It is this combination of immediate costs and
delayed rewards that creates the specter of procrastination.  Although
at first glance it may appear that a household that borrows funds gets
an immediate benefit, this is the case only when it leads to immediate
consumption.  A payday loan used to acquire groceries or for some
leisure activity is different than one used to pay bills—the benefit
from paying bills is avoiding the future disutility associated with col-
lection agencies or having one’s utilities shut off.
Procrastination is particularly damaging for low-income families.
There is evidence that poor households have less access to financial
institutions and the full panoply of credit and savings products that are
readily available to higher-income households.203  While commenta-
tors have generally acknowledged that such a state of affairs will make
it more difficult for poor households to get out of the poverty trap,204
once one allows for TI households, it is easy to see that the problem
goes deeper; even relatively small hurdles can lead to repeated pro-
crastination.  If a poor household and a rich household have identical
short-term discount factors, but the poor one faces higher transaction
costs when entering financial transactions, it follows that it will have a
greater incentive to procrastinate.  In other words, both households
may procrastinate, but the higher immediate costs faced by the poor
household will lead it to procrastinate longer and in a greater number
of transactions.205  These higher transaction costs will lead poor house-
holds to smooth less than they believed optimal, from a long-term per-
spective, and less than otherwise equivalent households who face
lower transaction costs.
Thus, TI households may have lower welfare under either a re-
bate or a prebate.  Both mechanisms assume families will smooth con-
sumption, but the impulse to procrastinate may prevent them from
doing so.
Present bias also can raise the cost of income smoothing.  When
choosing between financial institutions, TI households are more likely
to enter into transactions offering lower up-front costs, even if they
have higher long-run costs.206  There is evidence that consumers react
to teaser rates from credit card companies in just this manner—choos-
202 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 188, at 148–49 (explaining why partially naı¨ve TI
households might not invest optimally for their future).
203 See Campbell, supra note 158, at 1563–64; Littwin, supra note 77, at 463.
204 E.g., Barr, supra note 107, at 123.
205 Cf. Campbell, supra note 158, at 1563, 1568–69 (noting that the fixed costs of learning
about financial markets tend to reduce participation by less-wealthy households).
206 See Bar-Gill, supra note 118, at 1119.
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ing cards that provide greater benefits up front, even though once the
introductory period is over the cards have higher interest rates.207
One can extend this general intuition to explain why poor house-
holds resort to payday lenders who charge exorbitant rates.  There are
two important characteristics of payday loan providers: (1) their loca-
tion and advertisement makes them very convenient, and (2) the
transaction costs associated with getting a loan are very low compared
to other sources of funds.208  This may explain why poor households
rely on them instead of credit cards; applying for and receiving a
credit card takes time and effort and must be timed so that it occurs at
a point in time in which the household has sufficient income security
to be approved.
E. Procrastination in Making the Transition Away from
Carbon Dependence
One of the goals of the carbon tax is to encourage households to
invest in making the transition away from carbon dependency.209  We
now argue that TI households face an incentive to procrastinate in-
vesting in carbon-abatement technology, e.g., energy-efficient appli-
ances, hybrid automobiles, and better home insulation.210  As with any
other investment, this requires an immediate expense to create a valu-
able future income stream.  Again, TI households are likely to pro-
crastinate in the face of even small present costs.211  This delay has
important implications for both the efficacy and incidence of carbon
taxes.
Indeed, a number of recent studies have found that time-inconsis-
tent preferences can lead individuals to procrastinate making analo-
gous exit decisions even when the immediate costs are much lower
than those required to make the transition out of a high-carbon lifes-
tyle.212  If these same dynamics are at play in a carbon tax, procrastina-
207 See Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Mar-
ket 8–9 (May 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622.
208 See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the
Price? 10 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Res., Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf.
209 See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 516–17 (arguing for dedicating some of the
revenue from a carbon tax for this purpose).
210 Since businesses need to make the same type of transition investments, they too have an
incentive to procrastinate, but this more general problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
211 See supra Part III.B.2.
212 See Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, Job Search and Impatience, 23 J. LAB.
ECON. 527, 569 (2005) (finding that impatient unemployed workers expended less effort to find a
new job); Teela Sanders, Becoming an Ex–Sex Worker: Making Transitions Out of a Deviant
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tion will both reduce the amount of carbon reduction from the tax and
also shift the incidence of carbon taxes towards TI households over
time.  Carbon emissions remain higher with procrastination because
families repeatedly fail to invest in carbon reduction since the benefit
of avoiding taxes is always largely in the future.213  And as other
households respond more rationally to the tax, the relative amount of
carbon produced by TI households—and the concomitant share of tax
they pay—will increase.
Although these two effects are true at all income levels, they once
more are especially pronounced at the lowest incomes.  Assume, as we
have throughout, that the poor and rich have the same level of short-
term impatience and level of awareness about their self-control
problems.  Nonetheless, carbon tax will leave a poor household worse
off because the household faces higher immediate costs of making the
transition to a lower carbon-consumption lifestyle.214  Households that
are liquidity-constrained will need to save before they can invest in
these more efficient durable goods, but this will require them to divert
funds away from higher-utility products, such as food or shelter.215
Because of this, poor households are more likely to procrastinate in
making the transition away from carbon consumption than wealthier
households.
This general inequality is exacerbated by the fact that the transi-
tion to more energy-efficient durable goods has been going on for a
long time and rich households are more likely to replace appliances
and automobiles.216  In fact, many poor households live in rental units
and have to make do with the appliances provided by the landlord.217
Given that, as a general rule, renters are responsible for paying utili-
Career, 2 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 74, 75 (2007) (describing studies finding that women delay
leaving the sex trade because of the immediate economic costs of exiting, such as the loss of
funds to finance drug use and the lack of available alternative work); Hanming Fang & Dan
Silverman, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY, 50
INT’L ECON. REV. 1043, 1065–70 (2009) (finding that impatient women exerted less effort to
transition from welfare to work); Francesco Drago, Career Consequences of Hyperbolic Time
Preferences 3 (Inst. for the Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 2113, 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=706281 (finding that impatient employees expended less effort to get
promoted).
213 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing overconsumption and delayed benefits).
214 Cf. Super, supra note 5, at 1149 (noting that the costs of energy efficiency may be a bar
for low-income families, even with some government assistance).
215 See GRUBER, supra note 26, at 29–34 (discussing marginal utility and budget
constraints).
216 Cf. Shammin & Bullard, supra note 2, at 2436 (finding that poorer households make use
of more carbon-intensive products).
217 See Richard Counihan and David Nemtzow, Energy Conservation and the Rental Hous-
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ties, landlords are unlikely to replace existing appliances with energy-
efficient ones.218  And even if renters prefer energy-efficient housing,
energy efficiency may be difficult to determine before move-in.219  In
conclusion, one would expect that at the very start of a carbon tax
regime, poor households will already be at a relative disadvantage—
they are more likely to own “clunker” appliances and automobiles.
F. Procrastination in Acquiring Information
To make a decision to smooth consumption, a household needs
more than the general awareness that a carbon tax is in place and that
a rebate is forthcoming; it needs the right type of information, at the
right time.  We now show that TI households have an incentive to
procrastinate in acquiring information that could reduce the hidden-
taxes problem or put them in a better position to make long-term fi-
nancial decisions.
Transacting parties—including taxpayers who are in a long-term
transaction with the taxing authority—acquire information to inform
themselves of transactional hazards and to help them reduce those
hazards.220  In the same way, a household subject to carbon taxes will
need to determine how much information to acquire about the costs
and benefits of investing in carbon abatement, about future shocks
that may make it sensible to save some of the prebate, about providers
of credit who will help it smooth consumption, and about more gen-
eral information regarding the carbon tax itself.221  Once a household
determines that the benefits of acquiring a piece of information ex-
ceed the costs, it must still decide when to follow through.222  As in
ing Market, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 1103, 1105 (1981) (explaining that “rentals tend to be older and
more energy-inefficient than owner-occupied properties”).
218 Id.
219 See id.
220 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 269–71 (1984) (analyzing the incentives of transacting parties to acquire
and reveal information).
221 See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Prefer-
ences and Participation in Financial Education Programs 2–3 (Inst. for the Study of Lab., Discus-
sion Paper No. 3507, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139877 (explaining that
households must decide how much effort to invest in acquiring information about financial
matters).
222 While sometimes it is beneficial to acquire information immediately, at other times it is
valuable to wait, given that uncertainty regarding the value of that information may be reduced
over time.  As Kenneth Arrow argues, investments in information often represent irreversible
investments that depreciate over time in the same fashion as capital investments in tangible
assets. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONS 39–41 (1974).  An implication of
the irreversibility of investments in information is that waiting to acquire information until some
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any procrastinating context, a household will have an incentive to pro-
crastinate acquiring information whenever the gains from delaying for
one period exceed the (discounted) lost benefits from that one-period
delay (for example, in the form of a decline in the value of that infor-
mation).  Procrastination in acquiring information can lead house-
holds to underappreciate the need to react to the carbon tax, to fail to
seek out alternate sources of funds, and to neglect the value of invest-
ing in carbon abatement.223
Importantly, households may procrastinate not only in acquiring
information about the external world, but also about themselves, such
as information about their own skills and talents or even their propen-
sities to procrastinate.224  In addition to the actual costs of acquiring
this information, one must account for various collateral, often imme-
diate, costs associated with acquiring negative self-evaluative informa-
tion.  For example, the information may challenge an individual’s
positive self-image or undermine her self-confidence.225  Households
may thus procrastinate on opportunities to receive free information
about themselves if possessing that information creates immediate
collateral disutility.226
of the uncertainty regarding the information has been resolved may be valuable in the same
fashion that waiting to make irreversible investments in hard assets may provide the deci-
sionmaker with an option value.  On the creation of option values in waiting to make irreversible
investments, see AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
6–9 (1994).
223 See Meier & Sprenger, supra note 221, at 3–4 (reporting evidence that households pro-
crastinate acquiring costly information).
224 In addition to the external informational asymmetries discussed in the law and econom-
ics literature on contracting (for example, asymmetrical knowledge about the other party’s char-
acteristics), transacting parties also face what one can call internal informational asymmetries—
an individual’s informational deficits about herself.  These can include imperfect information
about her talents; her past actions, and their motivations; and her propensity to succumb to self-
control problems. See Roland Be´nabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An
Economic Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 137–38 (Isabelle
Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (discussing economic actors with “imperfect self-knowl-
edge, imperfect willpower and imperfect recall”).
225 A positive self-image is something that individuals value, and self-confidence and opti-
mism play an important role in preserving and bolstering those self-images. See Roy F.
Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 688–92 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (providing an overview regarding the body of literature on how
individuals construct and maintain their sense of self, and how they protect it against negative
information that may challenge their self-esteem).  In fact, one way of understanding an individ-
ual’s self-image is as an additional argument to that individual’s utility function. See Be´nabou &
Tirole, supra note 224, at 142.
226 Economic actors may engage in such “strategic ignorance” aimed at preserving their
current levels of self-confidence.  Be´nabou & Tirole, supra note 224, at 144.  As Baumeister
states: “Given the powerful motivation to think well of oneself, it is necessary to ask how people
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It follows, therefore, that one important type of procrastination is
what could be called “meta-procrastination.”  For the large part, com-
mentators have implicitly assumed that actors will undertake repeated
cost-benefit analyses to ascertain whether it is sensible to procrasti-
nate.227  People, however, often experience an immediate disutility
from thinking about the fact that they are procrastinating—whenever
the thought appears in their minds, they quickly dispose of it without
incorporating it into their general deliberation.228  Meta-procrastina-
tion can thus increase people’s propensities to procrastinate by mak-
ing them less aware that yielding to immediate temptation will carry
later costs.
G. Relative Access to Commitment Devices
We have just seen that even if poor and wealthy households have
the same level of short-term impatience, poor households will face
greater welfare losses from their time inconsistency whenever they
face higher transaction costs to enter into valuable transactions.  The
same argument applies to overconsumption; households with greater
opportunities to consume goods that provide an immediate reward are
more likely to overindulge.  Individuals with easier access to addictive
products, for instance, are more likely to become and remain ad-
dicted, even if they have a long-term preference to break the addic-
tion.229  But there is an additional reason why poor households may
suffer greater welfare losses: they are less likely to have easy access to
low-cost commitment devices, which are mechanisms for overcoming
time-inconsistent behavior.230
Some of the strongest evidence of time inconsistency, and real
world actors’ awarenesses of it, comes from the fact that people rou-
tinely resort to using commitment devices.231  Such devices are costly
manage to maintain such self-flattering views in the face of mixed and even contrary evidence.”
Baumeister, supra note 225, at 690.
227 See, e.g., O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 188, at 123–24 (modeling individuals who
periodically calculate expected future costs of procrastination in each successive period).
228 Cf. Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem
1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. W11867, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=872723 (claiming that deciding how to act in the future is experienced as a present
cost).
229 George Ainslie, A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation, 19 LAW & PHIL. 77,
79–91 (2000).
230 See infra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
231 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
103, 105 (1999) (noting that economists use commitment devices as evidence—“smoking
guns”—of time-inconsistent preferences).
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to implement, and, even if they were available at zero cost, people are
reluctant to restrict their future ability to act freely,232 unless they be-
lieve that precommitment is otherwise worthwhile.233  As a result, in a
world of time-consistent actors, commitment devices would not ex-
ist.234  Nonetheless, people with long-term preferences to eat healthy,
exercise, and lose weight join health clubs and go to special weight-
loss spas, both of which require costly up-front commitments.  Stu-
dents and professors use deadlines (preferably externally imposed) to
combat the temptation to procrastinate completing papers.235
Many of the most effective devices for committing to savings are
largely unavailable to poor households.236  For example, retirement ac-
counts and certificates of deposit come with built-in penalties for early
withdrawal.237  Time-inconsistent customers appear to appreciate this
feature.238  Again, because poor families have only limited access to
232 One cost of commitment is that people generally value their autonomy and find disutil-
ity in having their wills constrained unnecessarily. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:
A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 13–14 (1981) (discussing the cost of commitment
and autonomy in the realm of interpersonal contracts).
233 Once we introduce the potential of uncertainty regarding future payoffs, an intertem-
poral decisionmaker may find it valuable to have an option to reverse her original decision.  On
the creation of option values by waiting to make irreversible investments until a decisionmaker
has acquired greater information, see DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 222, at 6–9. See also Daniel
T. Gilbert & Jane E. J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of Changeable
Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 510–11 (2002) (finding that, although the
individuals who were given the choice to change their minds about which photography prints to
keep liked their choices less than those individuals who had no ability to change, individuals still
preferred having the option to change).
234 See Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 223 (“A rational decision maker with
time-consistent preferences would not impose constraints on his or her choices.”).
235 See, e.g., T. C. Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
290, 290 (1978) (discussing externally imposed self-control devices, such as creating an inaccessi-
ble savings account and understating dependents for tax purposes to reduce tax liability in
April); see also Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 234, at 220–23 (analyzing the role of self-
imposed deadlines in addressing the temptation to procrastinate); Klaus Wertenbroch, Con-
sumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue and Vice, 17 MARKETING SCI.
317, 318 (1998) (describing the strategic self-imposition of constraints in the context of purchas-
ing cigarettes).  Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs require minimum stays and full pay-
ment up-front for the required treatment period, a part of which it keeps if the patient checks
out early.  For example, the Cirque Lodge, a well-known facility of this type, has a thirty-day
minimum stay and requires patients to pay for that thirty-day period at the time that they check
in. Admission Guidelines, CIRQUE LODGE,  http://www.cirquelodge.com/Admission/Admis-
sionGuidelines.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“A deposit for 30 days is due upon admission.”).
236 Littwin, supra note 77, at 470.
237 For an overview, see Richard A. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution
of Individual Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 292–303 (1999).
238 See Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Sav-
ings Product in the Philippines, 121 Q.J. ECON. 635, 636–37 (2006).
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modern banking and finance, IRAs and CDs are often out of their
reach.239  To the extent that wealthy households have easier access to a
greater number of lower-cost financial products that have commit-
ment qualities, they will again have a competitive advantage over
poorer households, even if they both have the same level of short-
term impatience.
Illiquid investments can also provide commitment.  The econo-
mist David Laibson has argued that people with long-term prefer-
ences to set enough money aside for retirement make highly illiquid
investments in their youth—purchasing homes, for example—to pre-
vent themselves from overconsuming early in life, much like an
IRA.240  But this strategy often requires down payments to acquire the
illiquid durable good.241  As we have noted, evidence suggests that
down payment requirements are significant obstacles for poor house-
holds.242  So, again, there are disparities across income levels in fami-
lies’ abilities to self-commit.
It might be argued that a carbon tax rebate is itself a useful com-
mitment device for recipients.243  In this view, the year-end rebate in-
creases welfare for some impatient households; the family would
prefer to save, but lacks the willpower to do so.244  Delaying payment
until year’s end, on this assumption, would be a soft-paternalist inter-
vention leading to higher social welfare.
There are several flaws with this welfare-increasing logic.  First, it
likely describes only some households.  Others may be genuinely li-
quidity-constrained and would suffer large welfare losses from
delayed payment.  The policy challenge then becomes either balancing
the gains of delay against the losses, or designing a regime that allows
the government to sort the two kinds of households and offer delayed
payments only to those for whom delay would increase welfare.  We
take up this challenge in Part IV.  The second flaw is that postponing
239 See Barr, supra note 107, at 130–32; Beverly & Sherraden, supra note 167, at 466–67.
240 See David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions, 42
EUR. ECON. REV. 861, 868 (1998) (discussing commitment devices to deal with procrastination in
saving for retirement, including channeling funds to illiquid assets such as defined benefit pen-
sions, 401(k)s, Social Security contributions, and home equity).
241 See Adams et al., supra note 85, at 57.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
243 See Barr & Dokko, supra note 137, at 2–3 (considering the argument that tax rebates
are a commitment device, and reporting that many taxpayers claim that they intentionally
overwithhold for this reason); see also Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and
Mental Accounts, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193–95 (1990) (suggesting this behavior as an aspect of
mental accounting).
244 Barr & Dokko, supra note 137, at 5–6, 14.
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rebates to year’s end may actually not be a long enough delay for
many households; their need is to save for the much longer term, such
as for retirement.245  We are thinking here of the families that quickly
spend their rebates on luxuries.  In these households, delay has simply
moved spending from one low-utility usage to another.  Here, too, we
think there are possibilities for government intervention.  We set out
these possibilities in Part IV as well.
A final flaw is that self-imposed illiquidity is a highly inefficient
response to impatience.  Impatient households can prevent overcon-
sumption by denying themselves access to funds.246  But they also
thereby deny themselves the benefits of income smoothing.247  The
better mechanism would be one that gave the family access to just
enough money to smooth its income without tempting them to spend
too much.  This is a tall order, but government policies can perhaps
approximate it.
Lastly, one important characteristic of commitment devices that
has been largely overlooked by the literature is that they require an
immediate expenditure at the time of adopting them and produce a
benefit in the future when the actor keeps to her long-term prefer-
ences.  As a result, households that are sufficiently sophisticated may
have a long-term preference to adopt commitment devices, but if they
require a sufficiently large up-front investment, they will have an in-
centive to procrastinate.248  Of course, they may adopt commitment
devices to assure that they adopt commitment devices, but the same
problem arises.  As we will see in Part IV, this “meta-procrastination”
problem is one reason why governments can increase social welfare by
providing off-the-rack commitment devices that parties can opt into at
a lower cost than if they had to create them from scratch.
245 See Barr, supra note 107, at 123 (describing the failure of low-income families to save
for long-term goals).
246 See Angeletos et al., supra note 95, at 48–49 (analogizing to actors who place an alarm
clock out of reach to force themselves not to press snooze).
247 See id. at 59 (finding that hyperbolic households hold less liquid wealth and, accord-
ingly, “smooth consumption less successfully over the life cycle”); cf. Barr & Dokko, supra note
137, at 20 (finding that intentional overwithholding is inefficient unless the household places an
extremely high value on present consumption over deferred consumption); id. at 22 (noting that
the commitment to defer refunds can cause households to use high-cost debt for unexpected
short-term needs).
248 See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text.
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H. Immediate Versus Delayed Taxes
It is not just the timing of a rebate that matters; the timing of the
tax itself can also affect its level of effectiveness.  Compare two types
of tax schemes.  In the first, the consumer experiences the tax immedi-
ately, e.g., a gasoline tax.  In the second scenario, the consumer gets
the benefit of consumption before she incurs the disutility of the tax,
as with electricity, which is billed at the end of the month.  Assuming
normal long-term discounting, a delay of one day, one week, or even
one month between getting the benefit of consumption and incurring
the added cost of the tax should not matter much.  As a result, models
that assume TC households predict that the tax will in essence work
the same in both instances.  On the other hand, our model predicts
that the immediate tax will lead to a greater reduction in consumption
than a delayed tax that is otherwise equivalent.  In fact, assuming a
short-term discount factor of 0.5, a TI household will perceive an im-
mediate tax of $1 as providing a disutility of $2.
I. Summary
Shortsighted households will respond far differently to a combi-
nation of taxes and reimbursements than standard economic theory
predicts.  As we have shown here, even if shortsightedness is evenly
distributed across incomes, the consequences of present bias will be
especially disadvantageous to poor households facing a tax-rebate or
tax-prebate system.  Impatient spending can leave households with lit-
tle money for end-of-the-year necessities and increase carbon usage
overall.  Commitment devices for overcoming this problem are expen-
sive, and those afflicted by present bias may procrastinate investing in
them or even learning about their need for them.  And procrastination
will likely slow poor households’ investments in reducing their carbon
usage, leading to a vicious cycle in which the burden of a carbon tax
shifts more and more towards those families.  Taken together, all these
features point to an urgent need for policymakers to take cognitive
factors into account in designing a rebate scheme.  We take up that
challenge in the next Part.
IV. DESIGN OF FAIRER CARBON TAX SYSTEMS
Thus far, we have shown that annual repayments to poor house-
holds do not achieve distributional neutrality of welfare.  We do not
propose, though, to maintain fairness even if it means the polar ice-
caps melt.  Instead, drawing on existing research into behavioral eco-
nomics, we suggest in this Part alternative formulations of
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transactional consumption taxes that we expect to perform better at
recompensing poor households.  First, though, we must say a few
words about the inadequacy of some other versions of the consump-
tion tax offset we have not yet covered.
A. Problems with Other Consumption Tax Offsets
To this point, we have mainly critiqued the annual reimbursement
approach to distributional neutrality.  As we noted earlier, other
transactional consumption taxes use different methods to deal with
the regressivity problem.  These solutions, too, are unsatisfying.
First, the standard approach of exempting certain categories of
expenditures, common to both U.S. sales taxes and other nations’
VATs, is inefficient and particularly unsuited to a carbon tax.  As is
well known, taxing some forms of consumption but not others encour-
ages shoppers to switch to the untaxed options, reducing their welfare
without generating any tax revenue for the government.249  In addi-
tion, taxing some products more than others leads to difficult line-
drawing problems, resulting in needless uncertainty and transaction
costs.250  For instance, there is caselaw on whether ice cream pops are
“food” (exempt) or “candy” (not exempt).251  There is also a current
European Union dispute over whether arcade-type machines that
show pornographic films are “automated recreation devices” (heavily
taxed) or “cubical cinemas” (lightly taxed).252  And, of course, in the
special case of a Pigouvian tax, such as the carbon tax, exempting con-
sumption of the item that policymakers wish to discourage would be
counterproductive.253
Some jurisdictions have also tried to simply exempt persons be-
low a certain income threshold from having to pay consumption
taxes.254  This is not a viable option for a carbon tax.  For one, again,
exempting consumption of a good with negative externalities is
counterproductive.  More generally, such a scheme also creates
249 See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 513–14.
250 See Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Case for Extending the Sales Tax to Services, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 435, 446–48 (2003) (explaining the distortive effect of sales taxes on some goods but
not others).
251 To choose but one of many such cases, see, for example, O’Boyle’s Ice Cream Island,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 553 A.2d 1033, 1034–35 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (answer: candy).
252 Charles Forelle, A Peep at EU Tax Law.  Read On.  Really., REAL TIME BRUSSELS,
(Mar. 12, 2010, 11:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/03/12/a-peep-at-eu-tax-law-read-
on-really/.
253 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 514–15.
254 See Turnier, supra note 52, at 438–39.
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“cliffs”: sharp discontinuities in tax treatment at certain income
levels.255  That creates significant distortions in either actual or re-
ported labor effort near the threshold.256  Another kind of fraud is
also a problem: the use of straw purchasers to buy goods tax-free for
those who ought to pay the consumption tax.257
Lastly, other authors, evidently somewhat cognizant of the prob-
lem of some timing mismatches, have proposed rebates more fre-
quently than once per year.  Graetz suggests reducing payroll taxes in
each paycheck; some versions of the “fair tax” would grant monthly
prebates.258  As we have shown, the problem of income smoothing
does not arise solely across gaps of eleven months, but also from
paycheck to paycheck.259  In addition, these kinds of up-front pay-
ments continue to raise similar dangers to those that we identified for
prebates more generally: impulsive spending and other difficulties in
saving for anticipated future costs.260  In Graetz’s case, there is the
further problem that he offers no obvious solution for those who do
not work or work in the “informal economy,” and so already pay no
payroll taxes.261
In short, other solutions are still needed.
B. Self-Directed Debit Cards
In the absence of other effective solutions, consumption tax de-
signers must walk a narrow path between two opposing sets of
problems.  On the one hand, making rebate funds available too early
can tempt TI households into spending too soon, leaving them with
insufficient funds to cover their later tax and essentials, and poten-
tially raising carbon emissions overall.  On the other, locking funds
away may leave those households that would prefer not to have saved
worse off and will make all of them more vulnerable to short-term
255 Fennell, supra note 37, at 56.
256 See id. at 55–56 (noting that this problem arises for any sharp income threshold).
257 That is, low-income buyers can resell their purchases to high-income purchasers and
divide the tax savings.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56; see also Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer,
Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 & n.25 (2010) (recommending quarterly rebates of the authors’ pro-
posed gasoline tax in order to mitigate any potential income-smoothing problems).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 103–32.
260 See Part III.C.
261 In his book, Graetz does note that rebates could also be made available via “smart”
cards, which could help in reaching the unemployed. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UN-
NECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES
178–79 (2008).
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fiscal crises.  What is needed, then, is an instrument that will make the
rebate available throughout the year, but not too available, and espe-
cially not so available as to tempt the impatient.
We suggest that self-directed debit cards, or “SDDs,” can fill this
need.  Angela Littwin has previously suggested the creation of what
she calls “self-directed credit cards”: cards that would enable card-
holders to choose in advance to limit the amount of credit that would
be available to them.262  Littwin’s solution is similar to a proposal by
David Laibson, who suggested “a bank account that requires advance
notification for withdrawals” as a way to limit impulsive spending.263
The SDD fits squarely in between these two ideas.  The card would
grant the holder access to any account into which the government
would deposit the holder’s tax rebate.  However, the card would by
default permit only a limited amount of money to be withdrawn each
week, e.g., 1/52 of the total.264  Holders could change this default to
increase or decrease the amount of money available, but only with
some minor but cumbersome effort—filling out and mailing in a form
or making a phone call to a slightly understaffed calling center.  This
opt-out procedure would grant access to additional funds a short time
later, such as twenty-four hours.
This combination of defaults offers the benefits of income
smoothing to all taxpayers, while reducing the likelihood of impulsive
spending by those who are present-biased.  Taxpayers who place only
a small discount on future costs and benefits will easily bypass the
minor impediments to obtaining extra credit.  But these taxpayers are
not those who are likely to overspend.  Overspenders, as we have
modeled, are those with a b < 1; that is, they value immediate costs
and gains considerably more than equivalent gains and losses in the
future.  That is the psychological dynamic that causes them to spend
their rebate, even though they may know they will need the money
later to pay their tax or other important bills.  This same dynamic also
causes procrastination: even a small, immediate cost looms much
larger than substantial future gains.  As Laibson explains, the annoy-
262 Littwin, supra note 77, at 485–88.
263 See David I. Laibson, Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy
21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5635, 1996), available at www.nber.org/
papers/w5635.
264 We emphasize that we have chosen this figure for illustrative purposes only.  Given the
difficulty of balancing between liquidity and temptation, the amount of money that should be
available in a given time period is a key design question for any SDD program.  We cannot offer
a precise number in the abstract because the best balance will depend on the empirics of how
households respond to their reimbursements.
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ance of having to opt out of the credit limit now appears much more
significant than the benefit of getting extra money tomorrow.265  The
delay in any gratification also limits tendencies towards impulsive
spending.  But, in cases of genuine need, the money is still there for
the household to use.
We also want to emphasize the usefulness of allowing cardholders
to decrease the amount of money available on the card for any given
period.  This has several advantages.  Sophisticates, those who know
that they have a b < 1, may wish to set their limit even lower than the
default to prevent any impulsive purchases.  As we noted, many tax-
payers attempt to use tax rebates as a form of forced savings, but that
technique sacrifices liquidity that may be vital in the event of emer-
gencies.  Many taxpayers also immediately spend the rebate when it
becomes available.266  The SDD can overcome both these problems:
money is available when needed, but psychologically difficult to ac-
cess.  And we would also suggest a feature allowing cardholders to
commit in advance (albeit with a cumbersome opt-out process) to
transfer any year-end balance to a linked savings account so that they
will not be as tempted to spend the funds.267
An alternative version of this plan would simply allow the gov-
ernment itself, or qualified intermediaries, to loan rebate proceeds to
recipients.  The loan program could include many soft limits similar to
those that would exist with the debit card, such as a default cap, waiv-
able with some effort by the recipient, on the amount of loan funds
available in any one week or month.  The debit card is preferable,
however, because it would also have the significant advantage of giv-
ing access to modern banking to the large segment of poor households
that currently lack it.268
Each of these alternatives offers a number of significant benefits.
For one, they provide affordable income smoothing together with ac-
cessible commitment devices for households that usually cannot easily
pay for either, increasing welfare with little government expendi-
ture.269  Expanding access to credit could save government dollars in
other programs, such as food stamps and free healthcare, as families
265 Laibson, supra note 263, at 3.
266 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
267 This plan can be similar to the automatic mechanism employed in Thaler and Sunstein’s
“save more tomorrow” plan, which invites employees to commit to a program that automatically
inserts excess money into a savings account. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 104–19.
268 On the advantages of expanding banking access, see Barr, supra note 107, at 126–28.
269 See Fennell & Stark, supra note 13, at 47 (noting that a tax system that facilitated in-
come smoothing could increase welfare cost-effectively).
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will be better able to pay their own way.270  Though a debit card pro-
gram might carry some administrative costs, it could also be pig-
gybacked on existing government e-payments, such as the “EBT”
program used to deliver food stamps.
Other commentators have also suggested the use of electronic
debiting as a means for delivering tax refunds.271  Indeed, the climate
bill passed by the House encourages electronic payment where possi-
ble.272  In the absence of the additional cognitive features we suggest,
however, a debit card is perhaps even worse than a simple year-end
cash rebate.  Combining the card’s ease of use with the availability of
a large portion of the rebate balance—under the House bill, one
month’s payment—would be a severe temptation to overconsume.
The debit card is an important component of a successful design, but it
should be accompanied by rules that take account of possible cogni-
tive responses.
Indeed, these plans seem so sensible to us that we see no reason
to limit them to consumption tax rebates.  In particular, offering in-
come smoothing through a government-issued self-limited debit seems
an excellent vehicle for delivering the Earned-Income Tax Credit
(“EITC”), a form of social insurance designed for poor working fami-
lies and administered through the federal income tax.273  Currently,
many households use refund anticipation loans (“RAL”) to get early
access to their EITC payment, with the result that much of the value
of the EITC is skimmed off by RAL providers.274  Admittedly, gov-
ernment provision of the loan services would diminish the providers’
profits,275 effectively transferring wealth from the RAL providers’
shareholders to poor households.  Assuming, however, that the share-
holders are on average much wealthier than the rebate recipients, that
transfer should substantially increase overall social welfare.276
270 See Sullivan, supra note 92, at 384.
271 GRAETZ, supra note 261, at 178–79; GREENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 13–14.
272 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 431 (2009).
273 I.R.C. § 32 (2006).
274 See WU & FOX, supra note 126, at 12.
275 But see id. at 32–34 (discussing state attempts to limit RALs and the legal challenges to
these attempts).
276 Alternatively, society could reduce the total transfer to rebate recipients to leave them
at the same level as they formerly received, net of RAL fees.  This might be superior in welfare
terms to shifting all the money to recipients in the event that society has some third use for the
money that generates more welfare than either other option.  This could include a more efficient
means of improving the well-being of the rebate recipients.
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C. Accelerate the Costs of Carbon
As we have described, in the special case of a Pigouvian con-
sumption tax, such as a cap-and-trade regime, present-biased consum-
ers may overconsume the undesirable good, especially if given a
rebate in addition to their existing funds.277  Here, again, it is possible
to nudge consumers away from socially undesirable behavior.  In par-
ticular, because the problem stems from consumers overvaluing the
present, policymakers should attempt to shift the costs of carbon con-
sumption forward.  This can be done while maintaining distributional
neutrality.
If the government adopts the SDD, one approach to accelerating
the apparent costs of carbon might be to “penalize” carbon-intensive
purchases.  The carbon-tax component of any purchase might count
double or triple against the card’s weekly allocation.  That will make it
harder to make large, impulsive, carbon-intensive purchases, and even
small purchases will threaten to force the holder to engage in an un-
pleasant opt-out procedure.278
Whether or not debit cards are in use, the government could also
require the “purchase” of a license to use carbon-intensive products,
such as gasoline.  The money for the license would be rebated, plus
interest, at the end of the month or year.279  Because present-biased
consumers have a discount rate much higher than the market rate,
however, this exchange will feel like a loss, making high-intensity car-
bon consumption much less attractive.
V. OBJECTIONS AND QUESTIONS
To this point, we have argued that putatively distributionally neu-
tral consumption taxes may reduce welfare for shortsighted house-
holds and have suggested some “nudge”-like solutions.  In this Part,
we consider two important objections.  Both objections go to the
foundations of our project.  First, it might be argued that distributive
fairness should be measured not annually, but instead across the en-
tire span of each individual’s lifetime.280  In the long gaze of a lifetime
277 See supra Part III.C.
278 Of course, cardholders can always use noncard funds for their carbon-intensive
purchases.  But these other funds might be limited, and the inconvenience of planning how to
make each purchase could itself discourage this kind of arbitrage.
279 Cf. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 258, at 12, 37 (recommending that the authors’ pro-
posed gasoline tax be refundable to consumers, albeit in an amount equal to average per capita,
rather than actual, cost).
280 See infra Part V.A.
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view, brief timing mismatches between income and expenditures
might be no more than a blink of a welfarist’s eye.  Second, it could be
claimed that individuals who choose to forego borrowing against a re-
bate, or quickly consume their prebate, are simply maximizing their
own preferences, and therefore that it would be paternalistic to
change those outcomes.281  We believe both these objections are mis-
placed, but recognize that, for others, they retain strong appeal.
A. Lifetime Versus Annual Equity
Metcalf and other environmental economists argue that the best
measure of the burden of an emissions tax would be based on its total
effects over a lifetime.282  Thus, for example, a few studies claim that,
seen from a long-term perspective, carbon taxes are not as regressive
as others claim.283  The lifetime perspective is said to mitigate inequal-
ity for several reasons.  Most simply, if individuals can save and bor-
row perfectly, the economic burden of any one year could be spread
out over their life, so that any nonrecurring expense affects welfare
only if it reduces total lifetime income.284  We have already shown,
however, considerable evidence that individuals cannot effectively
smooth the impact of a tax-and-reimbursement system over even
short periods, let alone their lifetimes.  As a result, whatever its gen-
eral merits, this version of the lifetime-equity theory offers no reason
to set aside the distributional consequences of a consumption tax.285
The other versions are more challenging, as we now explain.
1. Problems Identifying High Marginal Utility Households
A second argument in favor of lifetime equity suggests that, even
if saving and borrowing is imperfect, there frequently remains a mis-
281 See infra Part V.B.
282 Bull et al., supra note 20, at 145; Jorgenson et al., supra note 34, at 395; Kevin A. Has-
sett et al., The Consumer Burden of a Carbon Tax on Gasoline 3 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working
Paper No. 147, 2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/Consumer%20Burden%20AEI%20
WP%20147.pdf; see also Don Fullerton & Diane Lim Rogers, Lifetime Versus Annual Perspec-
tives on Tax Incidence, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 277, 277–78 (1991) (making this argument about taxes
generally).
283 See Bull et al., supra note 20, at 146, 161; Jacobsen et al., supra note 42, at 486; Burtraw
et al., supra note 65, at 22; Hassett et al., supra note 282, at 9.
284 See Hassett et al., supra note 282, at 3–4.
285 See Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 217 (suggesting that since capital markets are
not perfect, annual incidence is also important); Shaviro, supra note 40, at 771 (explaining that
where some taxpayers cannot borrow fully, lifetime income mismeasures welfare since a dollar
may have different utility to the taxpayer at different times).  Some lifetime equity proponents
acknowledge this point.  Bull et al., supra note 20, at 149.
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match between income and true wealth, so that a person with low in-
come this year might still derive relatively little marginal utility from
government transfers.286  This would raise the possibility that current
income, and even current measurable wealth, do not clearly predict an
individual’s marginal utility from money.  A distributionally neutral
tax tries to make certain that the welfare effects of a tax scheme are
shared equally across the population.287  To make such a scheme work,
the government must make assumptions about how much utility a
household will lose by expending a given amount.  Conventionally, we
assume that households with the least wealth will suffer the most from
a set amount of tax.288  But if some households have immeasurable
wealth, those assumptions are untrue.289  Proposals aimed at helping
the poor might be too generous to these families.
To take a concrete example, consider two different three-person
households with annual earnings of $20,000, the Busdrivers and the
Students.  The Busdriver family has a head of household in the middle
of her career and at the peak of her earning potential.  The Student
family is headed by a young woman enrolled in law school (her annual
income comes from three months at a law firm).  If the households are
hit by a consumption tax, both may be able to rely on credit to get
them through their tight times.  The ultimate burden of paying off
those loans, however, will be far lighter for the Students.  For the Bus-
drivers, the additional payments will always be a significant chunk of
household income, while someday the Students’ credit card bills will
represent only a tiny fraction of their budget.290  So the welfare effect
of the tax this year is equal for both households, but in time, the Bus-
drivers struggle more.  If society has many more Students than Bus-
drivers, what looks like an unfair tax this year may turn out to be a
minor nuisance.
286 See Bull et al., supra note 20, at 148; Jacobsen et al., supra note 42, at 478; Hassett et al.,
supra note 282, at 2–4; see also Fullerton & Lim Rogers, supra note 282, at 278 (observing that
workers with “average permanent income” but volatile incomes may be misidentified as poor).
287 See Metcalf, supra note 4, at 14 (describing a distribution-neutral tax scheme).
288 See Harsanyi, supra note 48, at 254.
289 See Hassett et al., supra note 282, at 2–3; see also Bull et al., supra note 20, at 148
(“[E]lderly people drawing down their savings in retirement will look poor when in fact they
may be comfortably well off in a lifetime context.”).
290 Of course, it is also possible that the Busdriver family will not borrow to make up for
lost present consumption—for example, because they anticipate their future liquidity crunch and
thus refrain from incurring more debt.  But in that case, we can easily measure the difference
between the two families based on their borrowing behavior.  The more difficult case, which we
take the lifetime-equity proponents to be focused on, is the one in which present observers
cannot distinguish the well-being of the two families.
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One problem with this argument is that it appears to assume that
the social welfare function is based on long-term rather than current
utility.  To remind our readers, the social welfare function is the sum
of everyone’s preferences, including their preferences for the distribu-
tion of other goods.291  In this way, the hardships of poor families can
enter the social welfare function two ways: directly, and also through
others’ preferences for societies with much or little such hardship.292
Thus, a society in which most people would prefer to see extensive
redistribution from rich to poor might be made worse off by a policy
change that increased total wealth by transferring money from poor to
rich.293
Accordingly, by asserting that lifetime well-being is more impor-
tant than current utility, lifetime-equity proponents make two sepa-
rate claims: one normative and the other descriptive.  On the
normative side, the proponents are assuming that future welfare ef-
fects should be counted as part of the total welfare effect of a current-
year policy.294  We agree that that is a sensible thing to do—no one
would want to make everyone one dollar richer today by bankrupting
us all next year—but it raises the question whether there should be a
time discount.  For example, most bankers would rather have money
now than next year.295  Should the social welfare function count effects
fifty years hence as having the same value as those that happen now?
There is complex literature on this question, which we want only to
flag and sidestep for now.296
On the descriptive side, preferences for fair present distributions
might outweigh any other welfare effects.  Even if lifetime equity is
superior as a normative matter, it is possible that popular distributive
preferences rest on judgments about current welfare.297  That is, peo-
291 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 23.
292 See id. at 25.
293 See Inge Mayeres & Stef Proost, Marginal Tax Reform, Externalities and Income Distri-
bution, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 343, 355–56 (2001) (arguing that the social welfare function should
include a measure of society’s aversion to inequality).
294 That is, the lifetime-equity position seems to be that, in deciding whether a consumption
tax is unfair, we must measure not by what happens this year, but instead what happens over the
entire lifetime of those affected.
295 Solum, supra note 30, at 196–97.
296 For extended discussion, see generally Nancy J. Altman, Social Security and Intergenera-
tional Justice, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1383 (2009); Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future
Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2009); Daniel Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal
Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational Inequity?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1298 (2009).
297 See Solum, supra note 30, at 199 (noting that presentists would count welfare of future
lives only to the extent that the current generation has preferences for the treatment of the
future); cf. David A. Dana, Valuing Foreign Lives and Civilizations in Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
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ple may care that others suffer now, even if those same others will be
better off later (or vice versa).  That preferences might be present-
oriented in this way strikes us as both plausible and morally defensi-
ble.298  If people care about what their society looks like, they may
care about what it looks like now, or what it looks like by measures
that are more readily observable than lifetime welfare.  In any event,
for a welfarist who takes preferences largely as given, whether society
prefers to measure distribution on a yearly or lifetime basis is a de-
scriptive question—a question of fact.  A society with strong prefer-
ences for current distributions might view itself as worse off as a result
of a consumption tax even if the directly entering lifetime-utility por-
tion of the social welfare function is positive.  Neither we nor lifetime-
equity proponents can resolve the issue through abstract debate.
Even if lifetime wealth were the appropriate theoretical yardstick
for household welfare, the policy implications would likely be small.
Again, the upshot of the lifetime-equity critique we are discussing now
is that current wealth or income is sometimes a poor predictor of wel-
fare.  According to the literature, however, these errors are all false
positives—instances where a family that looks poor is not.299  But false
positives here are much less significant for policy design than false
negatives.  The cost of a false positive is relatively small—society
grants a rebate to a family that does not need one.300  The cost to soci-
Case of the United States and Climate Change Policy 8–14 (Nw. U. Sch. of Law & Econ., Re-
search Paper No. 09-47, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15
24337 (arguing that U.S. citizens’ preference for improving the well-being of other nations
should count in the cost-benefit analysis of U.S. climate policy).
298 While the moral question is, again, one that we wish largely to bracket, we should say a
word or two to suggest the plausibility of the presentist view. See Solum, supra note 30, at 199
(calling “preference-satisfaction utilitarianism, ‘presentism’”).  One possibility is that moral obli-
gations to provide for the welfare of others are cabined by our ability to know others’ well-
beings.  We cannot be held responsible for what we cannot reasonably know.  Lifetime utility
may be so unknowable that it cannot serve as the basis for our responsibilities. See Dinan & Lim
Rogers, supra note 5, at 218 (“It is not possible to actually observe lifetime income for individual
households . . . .”).  Another possibility would be that our obligations flow to others with whom
we are engaged in an ongoing project of mutual governance.  We share that project only partially
with those who will follow us; perhaps they will honor our decisions, but perhaps not.  If not, it
may be reasonable for us to assume that the long-term results of our decisions are largely out of
our hands in the same way that the welfare of citizens of other nations is only tenuously con-
nected to our own acts. But cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 160 (Erin
Kelly ed., 2001) (arguing that members of a community owe an obligation to leave as many
resources to the next generation as its members would have wanted the previous generation to
leave to them).
299 Bull et al., supra note 20, at 148; Hassett et al., supra note 282, at 3–4.
300 Note that the amount of the erroneous transfer to the Student family is not a loss to
society because the Students’ welfare also counts towards the social welfare function.
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ety is the opportunity cost of the use of these funds—that is, the
money for the rebate reduces general funds available for other uses.
So we must either give up that much in other programs or raise taxes
by an equivalent amount.  If we choose to raise taxes, the cost of the
false positive is the incremental deadweight loss of the higher tax
rate.301  Unless false positives are large relative to the size of the entire
population, the change in tax rates needed to pay for them will be
minor.302
In contrast, the utility losses from false negatives are large.  We
define a false negative here as a failure to award a rebate to a family
that would suffer disproportionately from a consumption tax in the
absence of the rebate, i.e., failing to recognize a poor household as
poor.  Thus, the social cost of a false negative is the amount of welfare
that would have resulted from transferring the rebate to a poor fam-
ily.303  As we have discussed, evidence from the cost of credit and
other factors suggests that the welfare consequences of these acciden-
tal redistributions can be dramatic for impoverished families.304  And
301 “Deadweight loss” refers to the welfare cost to society of raising taxes.  For example, if I
prefer watching hockey to watching curling, but hockey is taxed, I may attend a curling match
instead of a hockey game.  That decision lowers my welfare without raising any additional reve-
nue for the government.  This loss of welfare is the deadweight loss of the tax. MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 121, at 280.
Measuring the deadweight loss of carbon taxes is a complex undertaking because of the way
in which carbon taxes can interact with existing taxes and policies.  Ekins & Barker, supra note
20, at 81–89.  However, there is no particular reason society must use higher carbon taxes to pay
for extra rebates.  In theory, a policysetter should choose the revenue instrument with the least
deadweight loss.  Estimates of U.S. taxes have found deadweight losses of some forms of tax as
low as seventeen percent.  Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the
Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 128 (1985).
Even if carbon tax revenues will pay for the increased costs, that choice might actually
increase welfare.  It seems likely that any carbon price will initially be set below optimal because
of political opposition from industries that will bear some of the burden of the tax. Cf. James
Murray, Climate Bill Democrats Unveil Free Pollution Permit Proposals, BUSINESSGREEN.COM,
Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2251963/climate-bill-demo-
crats-unveil (reporting the likelihood of free distribution of carbon dioxide permits in proposed
legislation).  In that case, increases in the carbon tax rate will actually improve overall efficiency.
302 For example, suppose a rebate of $1200, the average current estimate. See supra note
11.  At seventeen percent, see Ballard et al., supra note 301, at 128, that implies a deadweight
loss per error of $204.  We assume here that recipients of false-positive rebates are, on average,
no richer or poorer than the general population, so that the erroneous redistribution has no
other welfare effects.
303 Put another way, the cost of the false negative is the utility of the rebate in the poor
family’s hands minus the average utility of that same amount in the hands of other taxpayers.
304 Recall that many households are willing to pay fees on the order of $30 to $135 to
accelerate a paycheck by no more than two weeks for an annual percentage rate between 150%
and 300%. See supra text accompanying notes 125–32.  At the lower bound, that is roughly
twenty to thirty times what middle-income borrowers would pay.  Although some of these excess
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in addition to the cost to these families directly, society would also
experience a loss of welfare from failing to achieve its own subjec-
tively defined preferred fair distribution.305
The relative sizes of false positives and negatives are important
because they imply that policies aimed at eliminating false positives
are quite likely to be misguided.  For a false-positive-reducing policy
to increase social welfare overall, we would need to be confident that
we eliminated many more false positives than false negatives with the
policy.  Considering that the very premise of the false positives argu-
ment is that measurements are difficult and take generations to as-
sess,306 it is hard to believe we could draw that conclusion with any
confidence.  So, for instance, a policy aimed at denying rebates to fam-
ilies with long-term borrowing potential would likely be a welfare
loser; while it would cut off the rebate from some Students, it would
also accidentally deny rebates to some needy Busdrivers.  Unless the
policy successfully finds many more Students than Busdrivers, it will
reduce social welfare.  It may be true that some families that look
poor by some measures in fact would not be heavily burdened by a
consumption tax.  But that is small comfort to those that are persist-
ently poor.
2. “Even Steven” Theories
A third version of the lifetime-equity claim, albeit one mostly in-
choate in the economics literature, seems to assume that inequalities
even out over time regardless of whether income smoothing is possi-
ble.307 Seinfeld fans might call this the “even steven” theory.308  In this
payments may be due to mistakes, for rational borrowers, this price differential implies a sub-
stantial difference in the perceived utility of additional funds. But cf. Alvin Warren, Would a
Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1100 (1980) (doubting that
preferences for present over deferred income can be used to measure the utility of use of that
income).
305 We acknowledge, however, that by assumption society will not be able to determine that
a rebate has been erroneously denied.  We meant to take no position here on whether planners
should consider the welfare effects of policies whose outcomes cannot be known by those who
prefer them.
306 See Bull et al., supra note 20, at 148.
307 For example, the so-called “additive lifetime utility function” presumes that we should
compare individuals simply by adding up all the good and bad that happens to them throughout
their life. See Matthew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian View, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1478, 1491 (2009) (noting that the additive utility function is the “standard assumption”);
Jorgenson et al., supra note 34, at 400 (measuring the equity of carbon tax assuming an “additive
intertemporal utility function”).  Thus, the claim that a carbon tax is not regressive over the
lifetime, utilizing an additive utility function, assumes that good events happening later in life
can counterbalance bad events earlier, and vice versa.
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view, lifetimes have more moral significance than any arbitrary unit of
measured time, so that a policy that is unfair to some is justifiable if it
is later unfair in favor of those same individuals.309  For example,
though the elderly are hit harder by a consumption tax because they
spend a larger portion of their budget,310 we should not be concerned
because in their youths they mostly saved and so avoided much of the
burden of the tax.311
This theory, however, has several potential holes.  First, it
presumes that what happens to a person later in life is morally rele-
vant to their earlier experiences; however, this is not necessarily the
case.312
Next, we agree with Lee Fennell that any sophisticated “even
steven” theory must explain how to account for gaps in time between
good and bad events.313  Even putting aside the diminishing marginal
utility of wealth, families may prefer to have good events happen
sooner and bad events later.  Studies suggest that most people have
preferences for the timing of their consumption.314  If government pol-
icy disrupts this pattern, it should arguably overpay to compensate for
the time value of the misplaced consumption.315  In addition, of
308 Seinfeld: The Opposite (NBC television broadcast May 19, 1994).
309 See Fullerton & Lim Rogers, supra note 282, at 278 (asserting that one measure of
distributive fairness of a tax is its total lifetime burden).  We assume this view does not contem-
plate the Calvins of the world, who justifiably ask, “Why isn’t [life] ever unfair in my favor?”
BILL WATTERSON, THE ESSENTIAL CALVIN AND HOBBES 82 (1988).  We concede that this may
be a straw-man version of the argument, but we are unaware of any more sophisticated articula-
tion in the welfarist literature.
310 Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and Differences
Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TAX L. REV. 725, 747 (1996).
311 See Bull et al., supra note 20, at 161 (“[B]ecause energy taxes have different incidence
effects across the life cycle, it is important to measure the burden of taxes in terms of lifetime
incidence . . . .”); Fullerton & Lim Rogers, supra note 282, at 278 (stating that patterns of income
and spending across age groups should be factored into an analysis of the fairness of the inci-
dence of a tax).
312 See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity over Time, 62 TAX L. REV. 333,
338, 357–62 (2009). But see Adler, supra note 307, at 1486 (“[B]ecause personhood endures over
a human lifetime, the ‘currency’ for individuals’ claims should be lifetime rather than sublifetime
well-being.”).
313 Fennell, supra note 37, at 12–13; see also Adler, supra note 307, at 1492–93 (acknowl-
edging that the possibility of preferences for the ordering of benefits and burdens over a lifetime
is an “empirical question”); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 1151, 1178–81 (2006) (doubting that multiyear comparisons between most taxpayers are
meaningful).
314 See Browning & Lusardi, supra note 37, at 1811; see also Fennell & Stark, supra note 13,
at 51–52 (summarizing other studies).
315 See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates,
and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 849–50 (2008) (arguing that in order for the
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course, there is the basic question of the time value of gains and
losses.316
Lastly, the “even steven” analysis assumes a perfectly designed
set of transition rules.317  At the time of implementation, a new con-
sumption tax will affect households at all stages of life.  Thus, if the tax
evens out only over a lifetime, many will never even out.  For lifecycle
balancing to work, already-existing households must get special rules,
whether grandfathering, extra rebates, or something else.
B. Paternalism
Another common argument against government policies aimed at
remedying cognitive or willpower failures is that they are paternalistic.
In the strongest form of the paternalism objection, the complaint is
that the government cannot second-guess choices other individuals
make; if an individual acts, we must presume that her actions maxi-
mize her welfare.318  A less sweeping version of the objection acknowl-
edges that people can make mistakes with their own choices, but
claims that government should not help to correct those errors be-
cause government intervention reduces our incentives to learn to
benefits and burdens of government to even out over time, government must compensate citi-
zens who must wait for the benefits).  Further, both planning for and adjusting to misfortunes
may carry additional costs, see Shaviro, supra note 40, at 772–73, which would also have to be
accounted for to balance the welfare ledger.
316 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxa-
tion, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 23 (1982) (observing that the opportunity for savings implies that life-
time smoothing of year-to-year inequalities may still be inequitable).
At a presentation of this paper, Matt Adler observed that all of these same objections can
be raised against annual equity, or indeed any measurement of utility over time.  We agree, but
each of the criticisms becomes more acute as the span of time that is to be added together
increases.  For example, it is more likely that the durability of ourselves as discrete moral agents
is sturdier across minutes than decades.  Further, as a descriptive matter we think it more plausi-
ble that society would be capable of forming preferences about utilities over shorter, more mea-
surable periods.
317 Cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 28, at 20–21 (stating that the Kaldor-Hicks claim that
utilities can even out over time fails to account for transition costs). But see Adler, supra note
307, at 1493–97 (arguing that the social welfare function should not include an additional dis-
count factor for events happening in the future, but instead can incorporate some of the conse-
quences of the passage of time in other ways).
318 See Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444, 445 (2007)
(arguing that consumer choice is the best available evidence of what consumers want); Robert
Sugden, On Nudging, 16 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 365, 367 (2009) (reviewing THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supra note 24) (claiming that “nudging” allows policymakers to substitute their own preferences
for those of the public). But cf. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behav-
ioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2120–23 (2008) (acknowl-
edging the claim that nudges impose the normative judgment of public officials, but arguing that
this is both inevitable and desirable).
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make better decisions for ourselves.319  We have both taken issue with
these kinds of arguments in more detail elsewhere.320
For our purposes here, we simply accept the possible validity of
either form of the paternalism objection, but note that neither has
much bite in the context of the consumption tax problem and the solu-
tions we recommend for it.  In the case of the strong form of the ob-
jection, claiming that government should not second-guess revealed
preferences is futile because second-guessing here is inevitable.  As
Sunstein and Thaler have pointed out, designers of a government ser-
vice must make decisions about how to structure their program, and
every possible structure may well have cognitive implications.321  Re-
sponsible designers who wish to maximize welfare must attempt to
assess the welfare consequences of each alternative.  In Sunstein and
Thaler’s example, a cafeteria must decide which food to put nearest to
the register; those foods will sell better than others.322  So, does the
cafeteria want to sell more fruit or more Twinkies?  It is no answer to
say that we should simply respect consumers’ revealed preferences be-
cause which preference is revealed depends (literally, in the cafeteria
example) on the architecture of the choice.323
Similarly, designing a consumption tax rebate offers a choice of
evils.  If the rebate is issued at the end of the year, some individuals
will fail to smooth that income forward over the course of the year.324
Arguably, that failure is evidence of a preference for savings, which an
antipaternalist would say should be respected.325  If, instead, the gov-
ernment issues a prebate, some individuals will spend the money im-
mediately, again failing to smooth over the year.326  That decision, too,
is a preference arguably entitled to respect.  So a responsible welfare-
maximizing planner, choosing between these alternatives (or, as we
319 See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1626, 1633–41 (2006).  Additionally, Professor
Glaeser argues that, in the abstract, governments will be less apt at identifying cognitive errors.
Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 142–49 (2006).  But this
argument is less trenchant as a reason to oppose responses to an already-identified error, al-
though it does suggest that any third party should be appropriately modest in its beliefs that its
solution is the right one.
320 See Galle, supra note 315, at 819–23; Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law, in
THE THIEF OF TIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253, 262–63, 266–67
(Chrisoula Andreou & Mark White eds., 2010).
321 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 240–41.
322 Id. at 1–3.
323 Id. at 3.
324 See supra Part III.D.
325 Of course, this assumes we are confident that there are no liquidity constraints.
326 See supra Part III.C.
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have suggested, some hybrid combinations) must necessarily make a
judgment about which set of preferences she would prefer to satisfy.
Sunstein and Thaler also emphasize that the paternalism objec-
tion is blunted when government policies preserve opportunities for
choice.327  No one has to buy a banana just because it sits, all yellow
and temptingly packed with potassium goodness, beside the regis-
ter.328  Similarly, prebate recipients need not spend down their prebate
in the month after it hits their mailbox.  Policy options that merely
structure, rather than determine, outcomes are more consistent with
individual freedom.329
In an important recent draft, Lee Fennell largely agrees with
these points but argues that “an unheeded nudge leaves the opter-out
worse off than before.”330  She claims it is unclear whether the cost of
this added burden for those who (wrongly) override the government’s
default outweighs the benefits of nudging others in the right direc-
tion.331  We think this worry is overstated.  As we have argued, part of
the efficacy of defaults is that they trade on the inherent present bias
of time-inconsistent actors.332  The actual cost of overcoming the de-
fault is tiny; it is only the fact that it must be incurred now that makes
it loom large.333  Thus, while we agree that the costs of opting out can
be deadweight losses for some individuals, those losses are likely to be
small (viewed ex post) relative to the benefits that would accrue to
those who abide by the default.
Under the second form of paternalist objection, though, even
choice architecture and default rules are suspect.  For example, Klick
and Mitchell aver that default rules weaken our ability to correct our
own errors by rendering us mentally lazy, dependent on the govern-
327 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 240 (distinguishing their suggestions from
other forms of paternalism because they still “retain freedom of choice”).
328 See J.J. Strain & Kevin D. Cashman, Minerals and Trace Elements, in INTRODUCTION TO
HUMAN NUTRITION 177, 192–93 (Michael J. Gibney ed., 2002) (noting the need for potassium
and its presence in bananas).
329 We acknowledge that this position does not fully answer the objection that government
lacks adequate information to set the correct default position. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 319,
at 151 (claiming that libertarian paternalism is unattractive to those who think that the problem
with paternalism is government errors).  The opportunity for individual choice, however, will
tend to limit the size of any government error because if the default is wrong by a sufficiently
large amount, then we should expect a larger portion of the population to reject it.
330 Fennell, supra note 37, at 42.
331 See id. at 45–46.
332 See supra Part IV.B.
333 This feature allows policymakers to design defaults that are specifically targeted at peo-
ple who are present-biased; individuals who do not heavily discount future costs and benefits
simply override the default and choose their own rule.
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ment to spot our mistakes.334  That is, government aid induces a kind
of moral hazard that makes individuals fail to invest in efforts to re-
duce cognitive errors because the government is insuring them against
cognitive losses.335
Klick and Mitchell acknowledge, though, that preventing some
cognitive errors may be welfare-enhancing.336  Insurance that induces
moral hazard is not always welfare-reducing, depending on the costs
of underinvestment and the value of insurance.337  So the appropriate
cognitive policy analysis depends on a balancing between hazard costs
and “insurance” benefits.
While we admit hazard costs are difficult to specify, there is rea-
son to think that the “insurance” benefits of a well-designed consump-
tion tax are very large.  For one thing, as we have seen, errors in
income smoothing can be very costly in utility terms for low-income
families.  Perhaps more importantly, there is evidence that self-help
mechanisms for overcoming those errors are simply ineffectual.338  If
taxpayers are using their rebates as a form of forced savings to over-
come their temptations to spend immediately, they are doing an ex-
tremely poor job of it—many save only until the end of the year and
then quickly dissipate the rebate.339  Yet, there is little reason to think
that May of the following year is consistently the best time to spend a
year’s savings.
In the face of such persistent failures, it would not be surprising if
a hands-off government policy actually weakened willpower by de-
moralizing those who try and repeatedly fail to restrain themselves.  A
well-designed policy might actually increase incentives to invest in
willpower by increasing the returns to investment.  We hope that our
proposals would move policy in that direction.
334 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 319, at 1626; see also Fennell, supra note 37, at 28 (noting
this possibility).
335 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 319, at 1626.
336 Id. at 1645–46.
337 On the tradeoffs between insurance and moral hazard, see generally Martin Neil Baily,
Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (1978).
338 See GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 143–60 (2001) (discussing commitment
devices and their failures); Angeletos et al., supra note 95, at 59 (explaining that the use of
illiquid investments as a commitment device lowers overall welfare); Barr & Dokko, supra note
137, at 20–21 (finding that taxpayers are inefficiently overwithholding to generate tax rebates).
339 Barr & Dokko, supra note 137, at 16.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, it seems clear that the consumption tax literature has yet
to truly grapple with the welfare implications of major transactional
consumption taxes.  That is especially true of economic dislocations
that will surely attend any efforts to slow the onset of global climate
change.  We have attempted to set out here evidence that, at a mini-
mum, human cognition and credit markets will play large roles in the
ultimate fairness of any carbon tax.  We have also suggested several
novel solutions that could mitigate these distributional impacts while
still allowing climate change prevention to move forward.  No doubt,
however, there are other and better solutions; we hope our contribu-
tions offer a small step towards finding them.
We have focused here on carbon pricing as the most politically
salient example of the importance of timing in the delivery of govern-
ment benefits, but it may not be the most significant in terms of over-
all welfare.  Other government programs, such as the EITC, create
similar dilemmas for low-income families and may involve several
times as much money.  Yet, existing efforts to deal with income
smoothing and cognition in these programs remain crude, with current
commentary failing to recognize the importance of the cognitive fea-
tures of the programs’ designs.340  Thus, in addition to nudging the
design of carbon pricing, we hope our contributions here will spark
conversations about reform of payments to poor households more
generally.
340 For example, Graetz notes that workers have the option to accelerate receipt of their
EITC payment and expresses puzzlement that few have taken advantage of that opportunity.
GRAETZ, supra note 261, at 171–72.  Our theory here suggests that this failure to use existing but
cumbersome mechanisms for accelerating payments is a compelling example of how procrastina-
tion can impede income smoothing.  Underutilization of the acceleration option may also reflect
some households’ efforts to force themselves to save.  The design alternatives we have suggested
address both these problems.
